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Cash management schemes for banks and set-off - a comparison of South 




Cash management is used by banks’ customers to optimise their interest income or expenditure. 
For prudential reasons relating to the calculation of reserves which a bank is obliged to hold, it is 
the subject of regulation in both South Africa and England. At the heart of certain types of cash 
management lies set-off, often referred to in banking terminology as ‘netting’. The impact of the 
law of set-off in South African and English law on the respective countries’ regulations will be 
explored in depth especially where insolvency law and set-off intersect.  
1.2. Background 
Banks are required by statute and regulations to hold certain minimum amounts of capital and 
reserves as part of their prudential requirements.
1
 In this regard, banks must submit returns 
periodically containing certain of their financial particulars to the South African Reserve Bank 
(‘SARB’).
2
 One such return is known as a Form 700 and permits the SARB to determine the 
extent to which a bank is meeting the Regulation’s capital adequacy requirements. This form 
must be submitted on a monthly and a quarterly basis.
3
  
Regulation 38(8)(b) provides: 
‘The percentage, contemplated in section 70 of the Act, of the amount of a bank’s assets and 
other risk exposures, as adjusted through the application of the relevant specified risk 
weights, proxies or factors, and which is to be used, as contemplated in the said section of 
the Act, to calculate the minimum amount of allocated qualifying primary and secondary 
capital and reserve funds and tertiary capital that the bank is required to maintain in terms of 
that section shall be a minimum of 8 per cent, or such a higher percentage as may be 
determined by the Registrar in consultation with the Governor of the Reserve Bank, which 
                                                 
1
 Section 70 of the Banks Act 94 of 1990 (‘the Banks Act’); Regulations relating to banks promulgated in terms of 
section 90 of the Banks Act, published in GNR 3 GG 30629 of 1 January 2008, the so-called ‘Basel II regulations’ 
(‘the Regulations’), Regulation 38 (8) (b). 
2
 The format and information required for each return is specified in the Regulations as a Form. 
3












percentage or any relevant component thereof, amongst others, shall be inserted in items 1 to 
3 and 17 to 22 of the form BA 700.’ (emphasis added). 
Debit balances represent claims the bank has against its client and are therefore assets. 
Since there is always the possibility that some of the bank’s clients may default on loans 
advanced by the bank to them, these assets are risk weighted to reflect the probability of a client 
defaulting on a loan.
4
 The current capital adequacy ratio is eight per cent. This implies that for 
every R100 the bank advances to a client, the bank must hold at least R8 in qualifying capital.
5
 
While the Form BA 700 is submitted on a monthly and quarterly basis, the monthly reports must 
reflect the average daily balances which are defined as the aggregate balance for the month 
divided by the number of days in that month.
6
 It follows that when a bank has a debit balance (or 
loan) on a demand deposit account at close of business, it incurs a capital cost on the amount of 
that loan which it seeks to recover from the client. A portion of the interest charged on this debit 
balance is the capital cost incurred by the bank. 
With traditional bank accounts, a debit balance repres nts a personal right the bank has 
against the customer for repayment of the balance and a credit balance represents a personal right 
that the customer has against the bank for repayment of the balance. These rights are personal in 
nature as real rights (i.e. ownership) in the cash passes to the client (in the case of a loan made by 
the bank to the client) or to the bank (in the case of a deposit made by the client).
7
 
Where the client holds one bank account with a bank, the balance on the account represents 
a debt between the bank and the client. But where the client holds multiple bank accounts with 
the same bank, some of which are in credit and others in debit, do these balances still represent 
separate and distinct debts between the bank and the client? It is possible that the debit and credit 
balances are nothing more than accounting entries in the bank’s books of accounts, that the 
separate accounts were created solely for the convenience of the client and that the balances on 
the accounts therefore do not represent separate and distinct debts between the bank and the 
client. Rather, the balances on the separate bank accounts are accounting entries relevant only for 
                                                 
4
 ‘The Banker’s Guide to the Basel II Framework’ published by the Banking Association of South Africa (compiled 
by P Styger and PG Vosloo) (2005) accessed at http://www.banking.org.za/getdoc/getdoc.aspx?docid=848 on 30 
March 2012 para 2.1.1 & 2.2.3.2.5. 
5
 For the sake of simplicity, risk weighting has been ignored in this example as has the different types of qualifying 
capital and their definitions. 
6
 Regulation 8 (1) of the Regulations. 
7













the purposes of calculating the general running balance (ie the net amount of the account 
balances) which represents the only debt obligation between the bank and the client.
8
   
In order to determine whether balances on multiple banks accounts held by a client with its 
bank represent separate and distinct debts between them or that the balances are merely 
accounting entries not giving rise to separate debts is a matter of the parties’ intention.
9
 
However, where the parties’ intention cannot be ascertained, either expressly or tacitly, what is 
the default position which is implied by law? This debate has evidently not been finally resolved 
in English law
10
 and the position is uncertain in South African law.
11
  
It is submitted that, absent the intention of the parties, the balances on the various bank 
accounts represent separate and distinct debts between the bank and its customer. Where a client 
holds one account with the bank, that account represents a debt between the bank and the client. 
It seems logical that by opening a second account, the balance on the new account should, in the 
absence of a contrary indication by one of the parties, follow the same principle. Moreover, if 
regard is had to everyday parlance, customers evidently share this understanding as well. For 
example, a customer will refer to accounts with credit balances as being accounts with cash in 
them even though ownership in that cash vests in the bank (for example, ‘I have R100 in account 
no. 1’) and similarly refer to accounts with debit balances as being a separate loan owed to the 
bank (for example, ‘I owe the bank R75 on my overdraft on account no. 2’). Customers transact 
on bank accounts as though they are assets (for example, ‘I am depositing another R200 in 
account no. 1) or liabilities (for example, ‘I withdrew another R10 on my overdraft. I now owe 
the bank R110 on account no. 2’). Whatever might be implied by law, the Regulations 
presuppose that balances represent debts between the bank and its customers (hence the general 
rule that will be discussed shortly that balances must be reported on a gross basis). For the 
purposes of this dissertation (unless otherwise stated), it will be assumed that balances on 
multiple bank accounts represent separate and distinct debts between a bank and its customer.  
                                                 
8
 Mark Hapgood Piaget’s Law of Banking 12 ed (2002) para 29.14.; Halesowen Presswork & Assemblies Ltd v 
Westminster Bank Ltd [1970] 3 All ER 473,CA at 488b.  
 
10
 E P Ellinger, Eva Lomnicka and C V M Hare Ellinger’s Modern Banking Law 5 ed (2011) 252: based on current 













Under the Regulations these balances must be reported to the SARB as gross balances 
unless otherwise stated.
12
 In other words, the bank is obliged to report a customer’s aggregate 
debit balances separately from its aggregate credit balances - the general rule does not permit the 
bank to deduct debit balances from credit balances. The ‘reduction of balances’, which permits a 
balance other than a gross balance to be reported, may be effected in the limited ways prescribed. 
These are by the application of set-off in terms of regulation 13, cash-management schemes in 
terms of regulation 16 or netting in terms of the relevant requirements specified in regulation 23. 
Of these, only set-off in terms of regulation 13 and cash management scheme in terms of 
regulation 16 are relevant. 
1.3. Reporting gross balances versus ‘reduced’ balances: cost implications 
Where a client holds more than one bank account with the same bank, the accounts typically 
have a mix of debit and credit balances at close of business. Reporting such accounts on the basis 
of gross balances means reporting a client’s aggregate debit balances separately from its 
aggregate credit balances. This basis of reporting results in the client earning less interest from, 
or paying more interest to (as the case may be), the bank than would be the case if the aggregate 
of debit balances were notionally set-off against or actually consolidated with the aggregate of 
credit balances.
13
 This pricing differential is illustrated by the comparison contained in Appendix 
I (scenario: aggregate debit balances exceed aggregate credit balances) and Appendix II 
(scenario: aggregate credit balances exceed aggregate debit balances). 
Thus, if a bank is able to comply with regulation 13, it may report the net position (i.e. the 
difference between aggregate debit and aggregate credit balances held by a particular client) and 
it need only hold reserves on the basis of this net position. The saving in the cost of capital to the 
bank allows the client to optimise their interest income or expenditure (as the case may be). 
The discussion so far has been limited to a single client’s bank accounts with a bank. The 
benefit of consolidating balances of various bank accounts can also be extended to multiple 
companies which are members of the same group of companies.
14
 In this scenario, one of the 
companies in the group earns or is charged interest (as the case may be) on the net balance for 
the participating companies in the group.
15
 The group of companies is then free to decide how 
                                                 
12
 Regulation 9(1) of the Regulations. 
13
 This is what regulation 9 (2) contemplates as a ‘reduction of balances’. 
14
 This is the definition of ‘cash-management scheme’ contained in regulation 65 of the Regulations. 
15












this interest income or expense will be allocated within the group. Although this involves 
multiple companies, the principles set out above (including those illustrated by the tables in 
appendices I and II) apply equally in a group setting. 
Methods of achieving this consolidation (whether at single entity or group entity level) lie 
at the heart of cash management as practiced by banks. It is useful, when analysing and 
describing cash management schemes, to classify the schemes and the level at which they 
operate. Two useful distinctions can be drawn. 
 Single entity versus multiple legal entities (or group companies) cash management: the 
level at which a cash management scheme operates. 
 Notional pooling versus actual pooling schemes: whether the scheme (at single entity 
or multiple legal entity level) notionally creates a net position or actually transfers or 
pools (sometimes referred to as ‘sweeping’) funds between various bank accounts 
and/or entities. 
In the light of the obvious implications that such schemes have for the holding of capital 
reserves, it is not surprising that they are dealt with in the Regulations. As noted above, the 
Regulations make it quite clear that, in general, reporting must be made on the basis of gross 
balances and that there are two exceptions to this rule. 
The first exception applies to single legal entities only and is a notional pooling system 
based on a legal right of set-off held by the bank.
16
 The most critical and difficult requirement (at 
least in South African law) is that the legal right of set-off must be enforceable on the insolvency 
of the bank or the client. The central bank wishes to ensure that on insolvency of the bank or the 
client, the solvent party is able to create a legal net balance representing a single claim (owing by 
the client to the bank or vice-versa) which cannot be challenged by the liquidator.
17
 If set-off is 
invoked by the bank and the liquidator is able to successfully challenge it, the liquidator will be 
able to ‘cherry pick’ credit balances (i.e. demand repayment of the full amount owing by the 
bank to the liquidated client) whereas the bank would only have a concurrent claim for debit 
                                                 
16
 Regulation 13 of the Regulations. 
17
 For the sake of brevity, the term ‘liquidator’ will be used as will terminology related to winding up of companies. 













balances (i.e. claims it has against the insolvent client). Should this occur, the bank may discover 
that it is holding inadequate capital reserves for these debit balance exposures.
18
 
The second exception applies to group companies only and is an actual pooling system 
based on the actual transfers of balances between participating companies at the close of business 
of each day.
19
 Although a number of different schemes can be established which would all 
comply with the Regulations, the typical cash management scheme for group companies has a 
company (often but not always the holding company) which acts as a centralising company to 
which all the other companies’ balances are transferred and concentrated. The effect of these 
transfers is to create intercompany loans between the centralising company and the other 
companies and to reduce or increase the gross balances of such other companies’ to zero.
20
 In 
other words, the credit and debit balances of all bank accounts in the group are transferred to and 
consolidated in the centralising company which earns or is charged interest on its consolidated 
balance (which is the consolidated position for the participating group companies).  
The most significant requirement for cash management for multiple legal entities is that the 
scheme is limited to companies within the same group and may not be extended to arrangements 
between other entities such as trusts, close corporations or natural persons. 
1.4. Definition 
The term ‘cash management scheme’ is statutorily defined as ‘an agreement between a bank and 
such of its clients as are members of the same group of companies in respect of which group 
annual financial statements are required to be completed in terms of the provisions of section 
228(1) of the Companies Act, which agreement provides for transfers of balances between such 
clients’ accounts kept in the accounting records of the bank, and which transfers are made in 
order to minimise the interest expense or to maximise the interest income of such clients.’
21
 This 
definition is, however, narrow and does not reflect the everyday usage of the term by bankers 
                                                 
18
 In practice, a creditor with a concurrent claim against an insolvent company in liquidation usually receives a very 
modest dividend (if any). 
19
 Regulation 16. 
20
 Where the participating company has a credit balance with the bank, the balance is transferred to the centralising 
company by way of an intercompany loan. The nominated company becomes a debtor of the participating company 
and a creditor of the bank in relation to the balance transferred. Where the participating company has a debit 
balance, the balance is transferred to the centralising company by the centralising company lending the amount of 
the debit balance to the participating company (thereby creating an intercompany loan). The funding is either 
provided from the centralising company’s available cash balances with the bank or borrowed from the bank.  
21












and their corporate clients. Their understanding of the term ‘cash management’ is far broader and 
can only be properly understood once the background to cash management has been sketched.  
‘Cash management’ is not a term of art. For the purposes of this dissertation, cash 
management will be defined as any scheme or method adopted by the bank and its client or 
clients (where such clients are members of the same group of companies), the objective of which 
is the reduction of gross account balances, either notionally or actually, reported by the bank to 
the central bank for the purposes of maximizing interest income or minimizing interest 
expenditure for the client or clients.  
1.5. Structure of the dissertation 
This dissertation will therefore begin by analysing the arrangements for single legal entity cash 
management and the law of set-off in South African and English law. Multiple legal entity cash 
management will then be dealt with in greater detail as well as the regulatory framework of both 
South African and English law. Where relevant, the impact of set-off in South African and 
English law on cash management schemes for banks will be addressed. 
Set-off usually refers to the discharge of reciprocal obligations between the same parties. It 
can occur automatically at common law or by agreement between parties. The parties may agree 
that it occur automatically on the occurrence of an event (such as an insolvency event) or that 
one of the parties may invoke set-off.
22
 South African law does not permit set-off once 
insolvency has commenced. This rule is subject to statutory exceptions.
23
 It will be argued that 
none of these exceptions are relevant to cash management. Since a critical requirement for single 
legal entity cash management is a legal right of set-off which is enforceable on insolvency, a key 
issue that will also be addressed is whether a right of set-off once exercised operates 
retroactively. If it operates retroactively, perhaps to a time before insolvency commenced, then 
set-off on insolvency may be permissible.  
It will finally be argued that under current South African insolvency law it is impossible to 
comply with regulation 13 and that the Insolvency Act
24
 should be amended to provide for a 
legally enforceable right of set-off on insolvency thereby accommodating notional pooling. It 
                                                 
22
 When by agreement, set-off can be multi-lateral and operate between more than two parties. 
23
 Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, ss 35A and 35B. 
24












will be further argued that notional pooling is simpler than and preferable to actual pooling for 
group companies.  
Cross-border cash management schemes (also referred to as global liquidity management) 
falls outside the scope of this dissertation. It should be noted that there are important regulatory 
and tax implications for these schemes as their legal effect and consequences may differ across 
jurisdictions. 
There are other legal issues pertaining to cash management which also fall outside the 
scope of this dissertation and are mentioned only in passing: compliance with s 45 of the 
Companies Act
25
 to the extent that intercompany loans are created, the impact of business rescue 
under the Companies Act on set-off and cash management, the concept of the best interests of 
the company (especially in a group setting) and tax implications for group cash management 
schemes.  
Legislation, case law and legal textbooks up to 30 April 2013 were considered when 
writing this dissertation.  
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2. CASH MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA: SINGLE ENTITIES  
2.1. Introduction 
Cash management for banks in South Africa is governed exclusively by the Regulations 
promulgated pursuant to the Banks Act. For single legal entities, a reduction of balances (i.e. a 
departure from reporting gross balances to SARB) is only permissible if regulation 13 is 
complied with.  
2.2. Regulation 13  
Regulation 13 (entitled ‘Set-off’) reads as follows: 
‘13. Set-off 
(1) When a client maintains both debit and credit balances with a bank, it may be 
permissible in certain circumstances to set such balances off against one another for 
the purposes of completing the prescribed forms, resulting in only net balances being 
reported. 
(2) Unless specifically otherwise provided in these Regulations, set-off shall be allowed 
only if all of the circumstances specified below apply. 
(a) A legal right to set-off shall exist, and the reporting bank shall in cases of legal 
uncertainty obtain a legal opinion to the effect that its right to apply set-off is 
legally well founded and would be enforceable in the liquidation or bankruptcy 
of the client or the bank. 
(b) The debit and credit balances shall relate to the same obligor. 
(c) Both the debit and credit balances shall be denominated in the same currency. 
(d) The debit and credit balances shall have identical maturities. 
(e) The reporting bank shall monitor and control the relevant debit and credit 
balances on a net basis in its risk management process and client database for 
the granting of facilities. 
(3) For the purposes of this regulation 13, obligor means any natural person or juristic 
person, and ‘person’ shall not have the same meaning as a ‘person’ defined in 
regulation 65.’ 
Sub-regulation 13 (1) does not contemplate set-off in the legal sense of the term. Rather, a 
notional set-off is intended in terms whereof the aggregate of debit balances are deducted from 
the aggregate of credit balances for the purposes of reporting a net balance to SARB only. With 
notional set-off the separate claims by the bank against the client and vice-versa as represented 












Sub-regulations 13 (1) and 13 (2) (b) clearly limit the application of this regulation to 
single entities only. The entities may be natural or juristic.
26
 
Currency risk and liquidity risk (which may result from a mismatch in tenor between debit 
and credit balances) are respectively dealt with in sub-regulations 13 (2) (c) and (d). 
A bank’s exposure when relying on regulation 13 (i.e. notional set-off) to a single entity is 
limited to the net position which is simply the difference between a client’s debit and credit 
balances. In theory, it should be sufficient for the bank to enforce the net limit by ensuring that 
the difference between debit balances (monies drawn down) and credit balances does not exceed 
the net limit. In practice however, banks often lack automated systems that prevent a client from 
exceeding the net limit by either increasing debit balances and/or decreasing credit balances (by 
making payments during the course of the day) excessively. This risk, which arises from 
technological and systems limitations, is addressed in sub-regulation 13 (2) (e). The practical 
measures that a bank may implement to give effect to this sub-regulation are two-fold: 
 On-going monitoring of the client’s account conduct to ensure that it remains within 
the net limit; and 
 Creating a gross limit for debit balances. A bank’s systems may only be able to 
enforce gross limits automatically- once a gross limit has been loaded on the system, 
no human intervention is required to ensure its effectiveness. This protects the bank 
from potentially massive excesses which a client can generate. In a worst-case 
scenario even if the client pays away all its credit balances the bank’s exposure will 
never exceed the gross limit.
27
  
The final and critical requirement is sub-regulation 13 (2) (a): the enforceability of the 
legal right of set-off on the insolvency of the bank or the client. This issue will be addressed in 
some depth. 
  
                                                 
26
 Regulation 13 (3) of the Regulations. 
27
 This is referred to as a gross-net limit. For example, gross-net facility limit of R100 and R70 respectively means 
that a client’s aggregate gross debit balances may not exceed R100 (irrespective of its credit balances) and its net 












3. SET-OFF IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW  
3.1. Set-off at common law 
Common law set-off (compensatio) involves the discharge of mutual debts between two persons. 
This occurs by means of the one debt being set-off against the other. The result may be that both 
debts are completely discharged or, where one debt is larger than the other, the larger debt is 
reduced by the amount of the smaller debt.
28
 The theoretical nature of set-off is uncertain: it 
should not be characterised as a ‘reciprocal cancellation’ of the mutual debts or as a form of 
payment (although its effect may be the same as payment) because no agreement to set-off is 
required.
 29
   
The persons must be mutually indebted in their personal capacities. Thus, where one 
person owes a debt in their personal capacity and the other in a representative capacity, set-off 
cannot occur.
30
 Both debts must be liquidated and due and payable
31
.  However, where a debt is 
due but either the creditor or the law affords the debtor additional time within which to pay it, the 
debt is considered due and payable for the purposes of set-off.
32
 Thus in Van Pareen v Pareen’s 
Properties (Pty) Ltd
33
 the managing director of a company had drawn a cheque for £75 in his 
favour on the company's bank account. After resigning his directorship and selling his shares in 
the company, he was sued by the company for the amount of the cheque. He argued that at the 
time he had drawn the cheque, the company had been indebted to him in the amount of £2,000 
and that a portion of this amount had been set-off against the amount of the cheque. The 
company countered that set-off could not have occurred because in the absence of a fixed time 
for repayment, the company was entitled to a reasonable period of time to repay. The 
shareholder's loan may therefore have been due but it was not enforceable. The court held that 
‘the most that can be said in favour of the contention [the company's argument] is that the 
company might have been entitled to a period of grace after demand for repayment of the loan. 
                                                 
28
 L T C Harms ‘Obligations’ in WA Joubert (founding ed) The Law of South Africa vol 19 2 Ed (2006) para 243; 
Schierhout v Union Government (Minister of Justice) 1926 AD 286 at 289-90. 
29
 S van der Merwe, L F van Huysteen, M F B Reinecke & G F Lubbe Contract General Principles 3 ed (2007) 546; 
but see Joint Municipal Pension Fund (Transvaal) v Pretoria Municipal Pension Fund 1969 (2) SA 78 (T) at 86A 
where it was stated that set-off is ‘a payment effected brevi manu’; J W Wessels The Law of Contract in South 
Africa vol II 2 ed (1951) paras 2559 & 2578: set-of operates a ‘reciprocal double payment’. 
30
 Ibid; D J Joubert General Principles of the Law of Contract (1987), p 286 
31
Harms op cit para 243 (c); Roman Catholic Church (Klerksdorp Diocese) v Southern Life Association Ltd 1992 (2) 
SA 807 (A) at 814I. 
32
Wessels op cit para 2560. 
33
















The performances due under both debts must be of eiusdem generis (of the same kind). 
Thus, mutual claims sounding in money are capable of set-off but not a claim sounding in money 
and a claim for the delivery of a thing.
35
 
Parties are able to contract out of common law set-off and agree, either expressly or tacitly, 
that their individual claims will not be subject to set-off.
36
 For example, it has been held that 
where two companies simultaneously exchange cheques on a monthly basis to settle their 
respective indebtedness instead of crediting each other, they had expressly or at the very least 
tacitly agreed that set-off would not operate in respect of   their mutual debts.
37
 It is submitted 
that the debit and balances on bank accounts held by a customer at the same bank are an 
illustration of this principle. The bank, to protect its interests, may obtain a contractual right to 
set-off the balances at any time or in specified circumstances (such as the occurrence of defined 
events of default).  
3.2. Set-off by agreement 
Parties who have excluded common law set-off from operating by agreement may also agree that 
mutual debts will be set-off upon the occurrence of a certain event (such as an event of default) 
or at the discretion of one of the parties. It is submitted that this should not be confused with 
common law set-off as the source of common law set-off is ex lege whereas an right of set-off 
created by an agreement is ex contractu. The relevance of this distinction will become evident 
when the issue of set-off on or after the commencement of insolvency is discussed below.  
3.3. The commencement of insolvency 
In the case of a sequestration insolvency commences when the court grants the provisional order 
of sequestration.
38
 Liquidations however are deemed to commence at the time of the presentation 
to the court of the winding-up application providing that a provisional liquidation order is 
subsequently granted.
39
 It has been held that the time of the presentation of a winding-up 
application to the court is when the application has been lodged with the registrar of the court in 
                                                 
34
 Ibid at 339. 
35
 Van der Merwe et al op cit 548. 
36
 Southern Cape Liquors (Pty) Ltd v Delipcus Beleggings BK 1998 (4) SA 494 (C) at 501B-D. 
37
 Herrigel NO v Bon Roads Construction Co (Pty) Ltd and another 1980 (4) SA 669 (SWA) at 676A & 676H.  
38
 Catherine Smith The Law of Insolvency (1982) 136-137. 
39














 For brevity sake, the commencement of both liquidation and sequestration will 
be referred to as the commencement of insolvency.  
Additionally, case law on sequestration is relevant to the law of liquidations and vice-
versa. This is in no small part due to section 339 of the previous Companies Act which applies 
the law relating to insolvency (i.e. sequestrations) mutatis mutandis, in so far as they are 
applicable, in respect of any matter not specially provided for by that Act.
41
 For the sake of 
convenience, the term ‘insolvency’ when used in this dissertation will denote both sequestrations 
and liquidations unless the contrary appears. 
3.4. The prohibition against set-off on or after insolvency 
On the commencement of a liquidation or a sequestration, a concursus creditorum is created. 
This crystallizes the position of the insolvent and its creditors and ‘thereafter nothing can be 
entered into with estate matters by a single creditor to the prejudice of the general body’.
42
 Once 
this has occurred a creditor may not do anything that will alter the rights of the other creditors.
43
 
The claim of each creditor must be dealt with as it existed at the commencement of insolvency.
44
 
The objective of this rule is to ensure that concurrent creditors are treated pari passu and that no 
one concurrent creditor should be preferred in its claim above another.  
Thus, contractual stipulations which on insolvency confer a preference to certain 
concurrent creditors will not be given effect to. In Administrator, Natal v. Magill, Grant and Nell 
(Pty.) Ltd. (In Liquidation)
45
 the contractor had agreed with the employer to erect a building. In 
terms of the contract, progress payments were to be made with the final payment to be made 
after the issue of the certificate of final completion. Clause 21(b) of the contract entitled to the 
employer, prior to making any payment to the contractor, to request that the contractor furnish it 
with reasonable proof all nominated sub-contractors’ account had been paid. If the contractor 
was in default in respect of a payment to a nominated sub-contractor, the employer could elect to 
pay the nominated sub-contractor directly and deduct such payment from any amount due by the 
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employer to the contractor. The clause also provided that any exercise by the employer of this 




Prior to the contractor’s liquidation, the building was completed and certain progress 
payments (save for the final payment) were made to the contractor. After liquidation it appeared 
that two nominated sub-contractors had been short-paid by the contractor. The employer elected, 
as it was entitled to do in terms of the contract, to pay amounts owing to the contractor directly to 
the nominated sub-contractors and sought, in accordance with the contract, to deduct these 
payments from the amount it owed to the liquidator.
47
 The court held that although the employer 
had validly exercised its election under clause 21(b) of the contract, it could not permit the 
deduction of these payments from the amount owed to the liquidator on the grounds that: 
‘…the exercise of that election after liquidation had supervened disturbed both the realisation 
and the distribution of the plaintiff company’s assets as prescribed by the law relating to 
liquidations. Were this Court now to uphold the validity of the election exercised by the 
defendant . . ., the door would be opened to contractual stipulations expressly designed to 
accord, on insolvency or liquidation, preference to selected creditors who would otherwise 
be merely concurrent.’
48
 (emphasis added). 
Set-off may only operate before the establishment of the concursus creditorum and unless 
all the requirements for set-off have been satisfied prior to this time there may be no set-off.
49
 
This principle is illustrated by the facts in Thorne (supra). A contractor had agreed to render 
building works at three sites and entered into three separate contracts with the government. Work 
at the three sites commenced but prior to completion of the contracts the contractor was placed in 
liquidation. The creditors of the contractor then resolved that the insolvent contractor was to 
perform its obligations under only two of the contracts and that work on the third contract was to 
be abandoned.  As a result of the contractor’s repudiation of the third contract, the government 
suffered damages which were quantified as liquidated damages. It sought to set-off (or ‘deduct’) 
these damages from amounts it owed the contractor on the two completed contracts on the basis 
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of a contractual provision which entitled the government to deduct liquidated damages from any 
amounts ‘due or to become due’ under that contract or any other contract between the contractor 
and the government.
50
 It was held that the government could not set-off debts that had arisen 
after the commencement of liquidation: the contractor’s right to payment to payment under the 
two performed contacts had accrued after the commencement of the liquidation, and the 
government’s claim for liquidated damages had only been ‘ascertained’ after liquidation had 
commenced. It is submitted that what the court meant in using the word ‘ascertained’ was 
‘caused’ or ‘arose’.
51
   
In view of the above, it is evident that set-off of balances on accounts which are due but 
not yet payable, such as fixed deposits, may never be set-off on or after the commencement of 
insolvency. As the tenor of the debit and credit balances must be identical,
52
 the discussion of 
set-off and insolvency in this dissertation will be limited to debit and credit balances on current 
accounts that are repayable on demand. 
3.5. Set-off prior to insolvency 
Set-off prior to the commencement of insolvency is dealt with by s 46 of the Insolvency Act.
53
 It 
provides that if insolvency commences within six months of the set-off being effected, the 
trustee may abide the set-off. In the case of set-off of a debt which was ceded, the time period is 
one year. However, if the set-off occurred during the respective time periods other than in the 
ordinary course of business, the trustee may with the approval of the Master disregard the set-off. 
The trustee may then claim the full amount of the creditor’s debt owed to the insolvent, while the 
insolvent’s claim would rank concurrently with the body of creditors.  
Although s 46 is not applicable to set-off which takes place between an exchange and a 
market participant in terms of s 35A or in accordance with an agreement contemplated by s 35B 
of the Insolvency Act, it is submitted that these sections are of no relevance to the set-off of 
balances on bank accounts. Section 35A deals with transactions on an exchange which is defined 
as an exchange licensed in terms of the Securities Services Act.
54
 Section 35B deals with master 
agreements providing for termination and netting. A master agreement is defined as:   
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‘(a) an agreement in accordance with standard terms published by the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association, the International Securities Lenders Association, the 
Bond Market Association or the International Securities Market Association, or any 
similar agreement, which provides that, upon the sequestration of one of the parties- 
(i) all unperformed obligations of the parties in terms of the agreement- 
(aa)  terminate or may be terminated; or 
(bb)  become or may become due immediately; and 
(ii) the values of the unperformed obligations are determined or may be 
determined; and 
(iii) the values are netted or may be netted, so that only a net amount (whether in 
the currency of the Republic or any other currency) is payable to or by a party, 
and which may further provide that the values of assets which have been transferred as 
collateral security for obligations under that agreement shall be included in the 
calculation of the net amount payable upon sequestration; or 
(b) any agreement declared by the Minister, after consultation with the Minister of  
Finance, by notice in the Gazette to be a master agreement for the purposes of this 
section.’
55
 (my emphasis). 
A question which arises from this definition is whether a bank and a client could conclude 
a master agreement that provides for the termination of balances on bank accounts held by the 
client with the bank and the netting (ie set-off) such balances to arrive at a net amount. It would 
be a straightforward matter to include the provisions required by subparas (i) to (iii) of the 
definition. However, in order to qualify as a master agreement, the agreement would have to be a 
‘similar agreement’ to those that are listed. Standard agreements published by the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association, the International Securities Lenders’ Association, the former 
Bond Market Association or the former International Securities Market Association deal with 
financial instruments such as swaps, derivatives and securities lending.
56
 It seems fair to 
conclude that the types of financial instruments and products that are envisaged by the definition 
of a master agreement do not extend so far as to include balances on bank accounts. 
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This interpretation is reinforced if one has regard to the legislative history of s 35B and 
comments made by the South African Law Commission on the section.
57
 Prior to amendment
58
 
the section heading was ‘Agreements on informal markets’ and s 35B(1) defined such an 
agreement as any agreement providing:  
‘…primarily for delivery, exchange, settlement or payment…on a future date, of, or in 
connection with, or based on, or based on the price of, currency of a country other than the 
Republic, interest rates, exchange rates, indices, gold, precious or base metals, financial 
instruments … securities …or such other commodity or corporeal or incorporeal thing or 
agreement as may be specified by the Minister, after consultation with the Minister of 
Finance, by notice in the Gazette, or any combination of, or option on, any of the aforegoing 
agreements.’ 
The types of transactions forming the subject matter of s 35B self-evidently do not include 
the set-off of balances on bank accounts. 
Two further aspects of s 46 are noteworthy. First, it appears that set-off is premised to 
operate automatically and ipso iure the moment the requirements for it have been met.
59
 
Secondly, there is a paucity of case law on the ‘in the ordinary course of business’ qualification 
within the context of s 46. To give content and meaning to the expression, recourse must be had 
to the case law where the same phrase is used in connection with impeachable transactions, more 
particularly s 29(1) which deals with voidable preferences). 
In determining whether a transaction can be said to have taken place ‘in the ordinary 
course of business’ involves an objective test; the ordinary business person must enquire whether 
ordinary, solvent business persons would in the normal course of business act in the manner that 
the debtor and the insolve t did.
60
   
De Villiers JP formulated the test as follows: 
‘...whether the disposition is in accordance with ordinary business methods and principles 
obtaining amongst solvent men of business, that is to say a disposition, in order to be in the 
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ordinary course of business, must be one which would not to the ordinary man of business 
appear anomalous or unbusinesslike or surprising’.
61
 (emphasis added). 
It follows that the fact the one party to the transaction is insolvent is irrelevant to the test 
and must be disregarded. A person, even if their liabilities exceed their assets may operate their 
business in a normal, ordinary manner in the hope that its fortunes will improve and it will return 
to solvency. And if the effect of such a normal, ordinary transaction is that one creditor is 
preferred above another then that too is irrelevant.
62
 All the relevant circumstances surrounding 
the transaction including any custom or usage specific to an industry must be considered
63
 along 
with the actions of both parties, not just the insolvent.
64
 It is submitted that in essence the test is 
attempting to identify either an abnormality in the means or manner which the transaction was 
carried out (for example, unnecessary or circuitous steps) or that the terms and conditions of the 
transaction were not those that would be expected of transaction between solvent business 
persons acting reasonably.  
Two crucial questions arise at this juncture. First, does set-off operate ipso iure and 
automatically when its requirements for mutual debts have been met? As mentioned in the 
introduction to this dissertation, it will be assumed that the debit and credit balances on a 
customer’s bank accounts are separate and distinct debts- this may be by agreement between the 
bank and the customer or possibly implied by law. While the balances on the accounts remain 
separate set-off would not occur. The bank, in order to protect its interests, would therefore need 
to enter into an agreement providing for the automatic operation of set-off on the insolvency of 
the customer. This is turn would raise the issue of whether a set-off effected pursuant to such an 
arrangement would be in the ordinary course of business or fall foul of the pari passu principle.  
Secondly, if set-off does not operate automatically but operates retrospectively (ie the set-
off occurs in relation to mutual debts that existed a moment prior to the commencement of 
insolvency), would an election exercised after the concursus creditorum had come into being be 
valid? Surely it could be argued that, notwithstanding that the creditor made their election after 
insolvency has commenced, the set-off was retrospective to a time prior to the insolvency’s 
commencement and that it therefore was ‘effected’ (to use the terminology of s 46) prior to the 
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insolvency’s commencement? Assuming that in the vast majority of cases such a set-off would 
have occurred within six months of insolvency commencing, the issues of whether such a set-off 
was effected in the ordinary course of business or violated the pari passu principle would also 
need to be addressed.    
3.6. Set-off: Ipso iure or retrospective? 
It is unclear whether set-off operates automatically and ipso iure from the moment all its 
requirements are met in relation to the reciprocal debts or whether it must be claimed or invoked 
by one of the parties and is retrospective in operation. There is case law supporting both possible 
legal positions.
65
   
In Schierhout (supra) Innes CJ held that:  
‘….. one debt extinguishes the other pro tanto as effectually as if payment had been made. 
Should one of the creditors seek thereafter to enforce his claim, the defendant would have to 
set up the defence of compensatio by bringing the facts to the notice of the Court --- as 
indeed the defence of payment would also have to be pleaded and proved. But, compensation 
once established, the claim would be regarded as extinguished from the moment the mutual 
debts were in existence together.’
66
 
This dictum is ambiguous and has been interpreted to support the view that set-off operates 
ipso iure and the view that its operation is not automatic but must be claimed and operates 
retrospectively.
67
 Numerous cases, before and after Schierhout (supra), have contained 
conflicting dicta on this point.
68
  
Legal writers also disagree on this issue and advance arguments for and against both 
positions. Joubert opine that the Roman-Dutch writers favoured the view that set-off operates 
automatically once its requirements have been satisfied.
69
 The defendant who pleads set-off must 
prove that all its requirements were met and that it took place but such a defendant is not 
exercising a right of set-off but merely proving a historical juristic event. The learned author also 
argues that the ‘balance of convenience’ favours that set-off operate automatically. To adopt the 
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alternative view requires introducing the fiction of retrospective operation of set-off which may 
have practically undesirable effects. To illustrate his point, he provides the following examples. 
A defendant, who is being sued for a breach of contract which he or she committed, would be 
able to nullify the breach by invoking set-off. Or consider the defendant who owes interest on an 
outstanding debt (i.e. the interest as already accrued) and who is able to retrospectively wipe out 
the interest by claiming set-off. Similarly, any steps taken by the creditor to obtain redress 
against the defaulting party for the breach of contract would also be nullified. Such an approach 




In a similar vein to Joubert’s argument, it has been argued that retrospective set-off could 
materially alter the financial position of the creditor: assets which had hitherto existed would 
restrospectively vanish from the creditor’s balance sheet or the creditor may have to repay any 
amounts paid to it by the debtor (such as interest) prior to the retrospective set-off.
71
 The 
creditors of the creditor may also suffer prejudice as a result of a retropsective set-off.  
Consider the example of a term loan, which contains a cross-default clause as an event of 
default, advanced by a bank to a borrower. The borrower defaults on its obligations to make 
payment to a supplier thereby constituting an event of default. Relying on this event of default, 
the bank accelerates all amounts outstanding under the loan and institutes proceedings against 
the borrower for repayment of the amounts advanced. At the same time, the supplier has also 
instituted proceedings to recover the amounts owed to it by the borrower who raises set-off in its 
plea (we will assume that the other requirements of set-off have been satisfied). If set-off 
operates retrospectively, then the default never occurred, the event of default was not triggered 
and the bank’s acceleration of the amounts owing by the borrower are a nullity. In short, the 
bank’s entire cause of action is retrospectively wiped out and the bank may find itself saddled 
with a nasty costs order.    
It is submitted that this line of argument loses sight of the fact that if the defendant is able 
to claim set-off (with retrospective effect), then so too could the creditor (the plaintiff). If the 
creditor was in the dark as to the course the defendant would take, then it would be in the 
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creditor’s power to remove any uncertainty by simply claiming set-off. This rebuttal though does 
not address situations where the plaintiff does not elect to claim set-off to the possible detriment 
of its third party creditors. 
Another policy based argument is advanced by Van Niekerk who argues that automatic set-
off helps establish with greater precision the moment when set-off occurs thereby enhancing 
certainty, that it promotes efficiency as debts are settled at the earliest possible time and that it 
avoids a multiplicity of actions.
72
 However, as pointed out by Van der Merwe et al invoking set-
off with retrospective effect will not necessarily lead to less certainty or a multiplicity of 
actions.
73
 Irrespective of whether set-off operates ipso iure or must be exercised by one of the 
party’s with retrospective effect, the procedural requirements and evidentiary burden will be 
identical; the party seeking to place reliance on set-off will need to plead set-off and prove that 
the requirements for its operation had been satisfied. While recognising that the earliest possible 
extinction of debts might serve a valid public interest, Van der Merwe et al identify a 
countervailing and important consideration: the need to recognise the autonomy of the parties in 
regard to relying on set-off.
74
 This need, it is argued, outweighs whatever public interest there 
may be in the earliest possible extinction of debts. It is submitted though that it is open to parties 
to agree that the operation of set-off between mutual debts will not apply and thereby attain their 
autonomy in this manner. Freedom of contract effectively grants parties the power and the 
freedom to create this autonomy should they so wish. 
The learned authors also point out that even if set-off operates automatically it remains 
open to a party to exercise an election: they can choose to either rely on set-off or deny or ignore 
that set-off has occurred, pay their debt and then claim the payment owing to him or her. This 
qualification ‘…recognises the autonomous decision of the party who makes the election as an 
indispensable element for the operation of the rule, and tends to undermine the notion of 
automatic operation and reduce it to a theoretical construction.’
75
 Of course, that party runs the 
risk that when claiming payment, the debtor may rely on set-off in which case they may be able 
to recover their payment using the condictio indebiti.
76
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One of the elements comprising the cause of action for this condictio is that the payment 
must have been made in error (which may be a mistake of law or fact)
77
 and that the mistake was 
excusable.
78
 The courts have refrained from defining what constitutes an excusable mistake: 
‘It is not possible nor would it be prudent to define the circumstances in which an error of 
law can be said to be excusable or, conversely, to supply a compendium of instances where it 
is not. All that need be said is that, if the payer's conduct is so slack that he does not in the 
Court's view deserve the protection of the law, he should, as a matter of policy, not receive it. 
There can obviously be no rules of thumb; conduct regarded as inexcusably slack in one case 
need not necessarily be so regarded in others, and vice versa. Much will depend on the 
relationship between the parties; on the conduct of the defendant who may or may not have 
been aware that there was no debitum and whose conduct may or may not have contributed 
to the plaintiff's decision to pay; and on the plaintiff's state of mind and the culpability of his 
ignorance in making the payment. (Consider, for example, the case of a person who, whilst 
in doubt as to whether money is legally due, pays it not caring whether it is and without 
bothering to find out.) These are only a few considerations that come to mind; others will no 
doubt manifest themselves with the passage of time as claims for the recovery of money paid 
in error of law come before the Courts.’
79
 
By electing to deny or ignore that set-off has occurred, the party is assuming the risk of it 
being subsequently held that set-off did in fact occur. They might then be precluded from 
recovering their payment by means of the condictio indebiti because the mistake they made in 
exercising their election was inexcusable. By way of illustration, suppose A sells a car to B for a 
purchase consideration of R10. B renders services to A for an agreed amount of R15. B denies 
that set-off has operated, pays A the purchase price of R10 and then claims R15 from A. 
Assuming set-off has indeed operated, B will have a claim for R5 (being the outstanding amount 
after set-off operated) and a claim for R10 on the basis of the condictio indebiti. However, unless 
B can prove that his or her denial of set-off’s operation amounted to an excusable mistake, their 
claim on the basis of the condictio indebiti will fail.  
It follows that the ‘autonomy’ to exercise an election is constrained by this very real risk. 
Assuming a party is satisfied that the requirements of set-off have been met, it would be ill-
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advised and foolhardy of them to deny or ignore this, make payment of the amount owing by 
them and then claim payment for the other amount owing to them. 
The debate as to manner in which set-off operates also has implications for set-off in the 
context of co-debtors whose liability is joint and several. Where a creditor claims the whole 
performance from such a co-debtor (as such a creditor is entitled to do), that co-debtor may rely 
on set-off should the creditor be indebted to them.
80
 But may a co-debtor rely on set-off in 
relation to a debt owed by the creditor to another co-debtor but not to them? If set-off operates 
automatically, the logical answer is in the affirmative; if co-debtors A and B are jointly and 
severally indebted to C in the sum of R100 and C is indebted to A in an equal amount, then the 
joint and several debt is cancelled by way of set-off and either A or B should be able to rely on 
set-off. However, as noted by De Wet & Yeats, Voet takes a contrary view.
81
 This implies that 
set-off does not operate automatically and must be claimed by the person to whom the debt is 
owed.  
Conversely, where there are joint and several co-creditors and one of the co-creditors 
claims the full performance against the debtor, may the debtor rely on set-off in relation to a debt 
owed by the other co-creditor to the debtor? Once again, if set-off operates automatically the 
logical answer must be in the affirmative. Yet, Voet still takes a contrary view.
82
  
It is submitted that Voet’s views on these issue are incorrect as they are wholly 
irreconcilable with his express statement that the plea (or ‘declaration’) of set-off ‘does not wipe 
out the obligation, but notifies that it had already been previously been wiped out’.
83
 This is an 
unequivocal statement by Voet that set-off operates automatically. His opinions on set-off in the 
context of joint and several debtors and creditors are therefore puzzling. 
3.7. The weight of authority 
The majority of the Roman-Dutch writers favour the view that set-off operates automatically 
once its requirements have been satisfied. Christie expresses the view that the ‘the overwhelming 
weight of authority’ maintains that set-off is automatic and has to be pleaded and proved ‘only to 
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inform the court that is has occurred.’
84
 This is consistent with the comprehensive review of the 
case law in Great North Farms (Edms) Bpk v Ras
85
 and the relatively recent decision of Southern 
Cape Liquors (supra).
86
 Although Van der Merwe et al advocate that set-off should be claimed 
by a party and operate retrospectively, they also state that weight of judicial authority favours 
set-off operating automatically and ipso iure and that this also appears to have been the position 
in Roman-Dutch law.
87
 They are also of the view that s 46 of the Insolvency Act was drafted on 
the basis that set-off operates automatically and ipso iure.
88
 
In the recent case of The Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Echo Petroleum cc,
89
 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal had the opportunity to resolve the debate about whether set-off 
operates automatically or operates retrospectively from the time it is claimed. Unfortunately, for 
the reasons that follow, this opportunity was squandered. The case involved a substantial sum of 
money deposited by the respondent into the bank account of one S (‘the 602 account’) which was 
held with the appellant bank. S held another account with appellant (‘the 253 account’) which 
had a debit balance. The bank had demanded payment of this outstanding amount in June 2008 
but it was only on 2 October 2008, after the respondent had deposited the moneys into the 602 
account, that the bank appropriated these moneys and applied them in partial reduction of the 
debit balance on the 253 account.
90
 The respondent sought to vindicate the moneys deposited on 
the grounds that the funds were earmarked for petroleum products that it had purchased from S 
and that ownership in the moneys would only be transferred to S once it had taken delivery of the 
products. The court rejected this argument.  
The respondent also contended the bank had been unjustly enriched and took the point that 
although the bank had demanded repayment of the 253 account during June, it had not 
appropriated the credit on the 602 account until 2 October. During this period the credit balance 
on the 602 account had fluctuated and, so it was argued, the bank ought to have made a fresh 
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demand for repayment on 2 October before relying on set-off.
91
 Hefer JA rejected this argument 
which the learned judge of appeal described as ‘wholly artificial’ for the following reasons: 
‘The debt arising on the 253 account was never discharged and the demand stood. Although 
set-off occurs automatically by operation of law, it only operates, retrospectively, if and 
when the debtor (the Bank) elects to rely on it. See Southern Cape Liquors (Pty) Ltd v 
Delipcus Beleggings Bpk 1998 (4) SA 494 (C) at 499I-501D and the authorities there cited. 
That election only took place on 2 October at a time when the 253 account remained unpaid 
and subject to the unsatisfied demand.’
92
 (my emphasis). 
The dictum is confusing because it seems to suggest that set-off operates both 
automatically by operation of law and retrospectively from the time that the debtor elects to rely 
on it. Not only is this conceptually and logically impossible but it is contrary to what was held in 
Southern Cape Liquors (supra) which the court cited as authority for this proposition. Perhaps 
what is meant by the term ‘retrospectively’ is that the court recognised that the set-off had 
already occurred during June 2008 ie in retrospect the set-off had automatically occurred in June 
2008. Indeed, this seems to be the only sensible construction of Hefer JA’s statement. It is 
unfortunate that this statement was not formulated in a less ambiguous fashion.  
Whatever the correct interpretation may be, the judgement is also problematic because the 
balances on both accounts ought to have been set-off as at June and not as at 2 October. 
Although the judgement does not state what the account balances were when demand was made 
in June 2008, it seems quite possible that the balance on the 602 account may have been 
materially less during June 2008 than on 2 October 2008.
93
 And if the set-off had taken place 
during June, why did the bank continue to keep the two accounts segregated? 
It is also unclear whether this statement is merely an obiter dictum or amounts to the ratio 
decidendi. The court found that the respondent had not laid a foundation for a claim based on 
unjust enrichment.
94
 In the absence of such a foundation, it is submitted that it was unnecessary 
for the court to consider whether the bank had acted lawfully in appropriating the credit. To the 
extent that the court did so, its ruling on this point might be considered obiter.  
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In sum, the law on this critical issue has yet to be definitively settled with clarity. Until 
such time as this legal question is settled by the Supreme Court of Appeal not only would it be 
imprudent for South African banks to rely on Regulation 13 to reduce balances for reporting 
purposes but, in the light of the legal certainty, it would be impossible for a bank to ‘obtain a 
legal opinion to the effect that its right to apply set-off is legally well founded and would be 
enforceable in the liquidation or bankruptcy of the client or the bank.’
95
   
3.8. Retrospective operation of set-off: enforceable on insolvency? 
Assuming, for arguments sake, that the Supreme Court of Appeal does settle this debate in 
favour of retrospective operation of set-off, would set-off by a bank of the balances on its 
customer’s accounts on or after its customer’s insolvency be legally enforceable?  
At first blush, it appears that such a set-off would not do violence to the pari passu 
principle. The set-off would operate retrospectively to a time just prior to the creation of the 
concursus creditorum. Both mutual debts would have been due and payable prior the 
commencement of insolvency and all the requirements for set-off would have been met (unlike 
cases such as Thorne (supra) and Roman Catholic Church (supra) where the debts either did not 
arise or become payable until after insolvency).  
However, there may still be contravention s 46 of the Insolvency Act. Although set-off 
would have been ‘effected’ when the set-off of the mutual debts actually occurred (prior to the 
insolvency’s commencement), the actual set-off cannot be divorced from the election to claim it. 
In other words, the set-off is linked to and is the result (albeit the retrospective result) of such an 
election. It is submitted that the word ‘effected’ must be given a broader meaning so as to 
include the election to claim set-off. Otherwise, the requirement in s 46 that set-off be in the 
ordinary course of business would surely be rendered meaningless. 
In this regard, it is unlikely that set-off can be considered to have been effected in the 
ordinary course of business. A solvent customer’s overdraft with a bank is not normally repaid 
by means of the bank setting-off amounts to the credit of the customer in other accounts. The 
customer will either pay funds into the overdraft account from other sources (for example, 
cheque deposits) or transfer funds from an account with a credit balance to the overdraft account. 
The bank might only exercise such a right of set-off where the customer’s overdraft is in excess 
or where the bank wishes the client to settle the overdraft and the client refuses to do so. The test 
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as to whether set-off has occurred in the ordinary course of business requires us to ignore the fact 
that the customer is insolvent. If we do so, then the bank’s exercise of its right of set-off would 
strike the ordinary businessperson viewing this transaction objectively as unusual and abnormal.  
3.9. Automatic operation of set-off ex contractu: enforceable on insolvency? 
A final possibility to consider is a contractual provision which triggers set-off on the insolvency 
of one of the contractants. If the bank, in order to protect its interests, entered into an agreement 
providing for the automatic operation of set-off on the insolvency of its customer, would such a 
set-off be legally enforceable. Technically, there would be no need for the bank to make an 
election or do anything for set-off to occur; set-off would be triggered by the insolvency 
commencing. It should be emphasized that we are not dealing with common law set-off which 
may operate automatically 
The difficulty with this approach is that it amounts to a contractual stipulation designed to 
prefer the bank over the customer’s other creditors. An automatic contractual set-off on 
insolvency would amount to the bank effectively using the credit balances the bank owed to the 
insolvent customer to pay (and thereby settle) the debit balances. Dicta to the effect that set-off is 
a form of payment (although incorrect for the reasons given by Van der Merwe et al)
96
 have been 
interpreted to mean that set-off has the same effect as payment.
97
 This would be contrary to the 
pari passu principle. 
It might be argued that the bank and the customer could have achieved the same economic 
effect as automatic set-off in insolvency if they had agreed that the balances on the customer’s 
accounts did not constitute separate and distinct debts between the bank and the customer but 
were merely accounting arrangements for the customer’s convenience. In other words, it would 
have been possible for the parties to have ordered their affairs in a different legal manner while 
retaining the same economic effect as set-off. However, the simple point is that the parties did 
not arrange their affairs in such a manner. They agreed that the gross balances would represent 
separate and distinct debts between the bank and the customer and that set-off would only 
operate on the customer’s insolvency. Thus, it is unlikely that this argument would succeed.  
It therefore appears that irrespective of whether set-off operates retrospectively once 
claimed or contractual provision is made for it to operate automatically on insolvency, it will not 
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be enforceable on or after insolvency. There remains the possibility of statutory reform to the 
insolvency regime, which will now be addressed. 
3.10. The South African Law Commission: Project 63 
The main piece of legislation which governs insolvency law in South Africa is the Insolvency 
Act.
98
 Although it has been amended numerous times, it has not since its commencement in 1936 
undergone a comprehensive review. It was against this background that the South Africa Law 
Commission was tasked with reviewing the Insolvency Act and proposing a draft Bill of a new 
Insolvency Act.
99
 Clause 28 of the draft Bill reads as follows: 
‘28(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) in this section ‘agreement’ means- 
(a)  an agreement which provides that, in the event of the estate of a party thereto or 
the estate of a party to two or more agreements with the same counterparty, 
being liquidated before such party has performed fully in terms of the 
agreement or one or more of the agreements; 
(i) all unperformed obligations of the parties terminate or may be terminated; 
and 
(ii) the termination values of the unperformed obligations are determined or 
may be determined; and 
(iii) the termination values are netted or may be netted, so that only a net 
amount (whether in South African currency or some other currency) is 
payable to or by a party; or 
(b)  any agreement declared by the Minster after consultation with the Minister of 
Finance, by notice in the Gazette to be an agreement for the purposes for this 
section. 
(2) In this section ‘agreement’ does not include- 
(a) transaction contemplated in section 27; or 
(b) netting arrangement as contemplated in the National Payment System Act, 1998 
(Act No. 78 of 1998); or 
(c) any agreement declared by the Minster after consultation with the Minister of 
Finance, by notice in the Gazette to not be an agreement for the purposes of this 
section 
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 Upon the liquidation of the estate of a party to an agreement all unperformed 
obligations arising out of such agreement or all such agreements between the same 
parties shall, notwithstanding any conflicting rule of the common law, automatically 
be terminated as at the date of liquidation, termination values being calculated at 
market value at that date and a net amount be payable. 
(4) Section 341 (2) of the Companies Act, 1973 (Act No. 61 of 1973) shall not apply to 
property disposed of in terms of an agreement.’ 
Suppose a bank and its customer were to enter into an agreement governing debit and 
credit balances held at the bank which complies with all the requirements of clause 28(1)(a). The 
agreement merely has to provide that upon either the bank or its customer being liquidated 
before the bank has been able to repay all credit balances and the customer has been able to 
repay all debit balances, these unperformed obligations will terminate, the value of these 
unperformed obligations will be determined as being their face value when denominated in the 
same currency or the bank’s spot rate at the time of the liquidation where a claim is denominated 
in a different currency, and the termination values will be netted (i.e. set-off against each other 
leaving a single net amount owing by the bank to the customer or vice-versa).  
Such an agreement would also not be a transaction contemplated by clause 27 (a 
transaction on an exchange) nor would it be a netting arrangement as contemplated in the 
National Payment System Act.
101
  
In the event of either the bank or its customer being liquidated, clause 28(3) would have to 
give effect to this agreement and ‘notwithstanding any conflicting rule of the common law’ all 
obligations arising from such agreements would be terminated as at the date of liquidation, 
termination values calculated at market value at that date and the net amount payable. In other 
words, clause 28 creates a right of set-off which arises ex contractu (assuming the contract 
qualifies as an agreement as defined) which is enforceable on insolvency.  
It is questionable whether this was the intention behind the drafting of the clause and that 
the literal wording of the clause gives rise to a far wider range of transactions than was 
contemplated by the South African Law Commission. To the extent that clause 28 was intended 
by the Commission to be a re-enactment of s 35B, it seems likely that it was contemplated by the 
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drafters that clause 28 was to be limited to the netting and termination of financial instruments 
and not extend to netting debit and credit balances on bank accounts.  
Nevertheless, the Commission did observe that clause 28 was ‘clearly not limited to 
informal markets’
102
 and on a literal reading of the clause, a right of set-off enforceable on 
insolvency could be created via a suitably tailored contract. It remains to be seen if and when the 
existing Insolvency Act
103
 will be replaced, the precise formulation of clause 28 and the manner 
in which it will be judicially interpreted. 
3.11. Set-off and cession 
The relationship between set-off and cession depends on a number of factors including timing 
and notice to the debtor of the cession. Where the reciprocal debts are due between the cedent 
and the debtor and assuming set-off occurs automatically, the debtor may not raise set-off against 
the cessionary as the cedent cannot transfer a greater right than it itself possesses.
104
 The same 
rule applies where the debt fell due after the cession had taken place but before the debtor had 
notice of it.
105
 The rationale for this rule is, it is submitted, that it would be unfair to the debtor, 
who has not received notice of the cession and has relied on set-off, to be deprived of it.
106
 
Where a debt is ceded which is not yet due and only becomes due after notice to the debtor of the 
cession has been given, the debtor may not raise set-off as a defence against the cessionary as the 




It would therefore be a prudent for a bank to provide in its standard terms and conditions 
that debts owing by the bank to the customer may not be ceded without the consent of the bank 
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4. CASH MANAGEMENT IN ENGLAND: SINGLE ENTITIES  
4.1. Introduction  
Bank supervision and regulation in England is the responsibility of the Financial Services 
Authority (‘FSA’),
108
 which was created in terms of and derives its powers from the Financial 
Services and Markets Act (‘FSMA’).
109
 The FSA has rule making powers, which permit it to 
make rules that apply to regulated activities
110
as defined in the Regulated Activities Order made 
by the Treasury.
111
 Since ‘accepting deposits’ by way of business is a regulated activity, the FSA 
can and has made rules regulating UK banks. 
The power conferred on the FSA to make rules is exercisable in writing and these written 
instruments (defined as ‘a rule-making instrument)
112
 are contained in FSA’s Handbook.
113
 Since 
s 153(4) obliges the FSA to publish a rule-making instrument in a way appearing to it to be best 




4.2. Relevant regulations 
The portion of the FSA Handbook that deals specifically with banks is the Prudential sourcebook 
for Banks, Building Societies and Investment Firms. The FSA designated acronym for this 
handbook is BIPRU. 
The relevant section of the BIPRU that addresses ‘on balance sheet netting’ is BIPRU 
5.3,
115
 which is reproduced in Appendix III hereto. At this point, it may be instructive to 
distinguish between the technical use of the terms set-off and netting. Set-off is a legal technique; 
netting is a process of which set-off may be a part. Although set-off is the most common 
technique used in the netting process, this is not necessarily the case.
116
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In order to be eligible for on balance sheet netting the claims between the firm (in casu the 
bank) and its counterparty (the customer) must be mutual i.e. there must be a reciprocity of 
obligations between the same parties.
117
 The reciprocal obligations are limited to cash balances 
(i.e. the right of repayment of cash deposited or loaned by one party to the other).
118
 
Expressly excluded from the ambit of BIPRU 5.3 are master netting agreements covering 
repurchase transactions, securities or commodities lending or borrowing transaction and other 
capital market-driven transactions.
119
 These agreements or transactions are dealt with elsewhere 
in BIPRU: master netting agreements in BIPRU 5.6 and contractual netting in BIPRU 13.7. 
BIPRU sets out four minimum requirements for on balance sheet netting. First, the on 
balance sheet netting agreements must be legally effective and enforceable in all relevant 
jurisdictions and in the event of the insolvency or bankruptcy of a counterparty.
120
 Second, the 
bank must be able to determine at any time the loans or deposits that are subject to the on 
balance sheet netting agreement.
121
 Thus, the bank’s systems should be able to provide the value 
of the reciprocal obligations subject to the on balance sheet netting agreement at any time of the 
day in a single currency. This can be quite challenging where the cash balances are comprised of 
different currencies which need to be converted at the spot rate in order to ascertain the net 
position of the bank and its customer. Third, where this form of credit protection (the ability to 
net reciprocal obligations) terminates (for example, due to the insolvency of the counterparty), 
the bank must be able to respond quickly and prevent further transacting on the basis of netting 
as to do so could prejudice the bank. Thus, the bank must ensure that the risks associated with 
such a termination are adequately monitored and controlled.
122
 Fourth, (4) the bank must monitor 
and control the relevant exposures on a net basis.
123
 A bank’s systems must be able to ascertain 
the net exposure in respect of a customer at any time and controls should be put in place that will 
prevent that net exposure from exceeding the net limit imposed on the customer. This can be 
quite challenging if the bank systems lack the ability to automatically enforce a net limit but 
must rely on intermittent human monitoring of the net exposure. In such a scenario, one method 
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to mitigate the risk of the customer exceeding the net limit (for example, by paying away credit 
balances during the course of the day thereby exceeding the net limit) is to mark a gross 
overdraft limit as well. If the bank’s systems can automatically enforce such a gross limit on an 
overdraft, then the worst case scenario for the bank (for example, where the customer pays away 
all of its credit balances) will be the overdraft’s gross limit. Although not ideal, this does go 
some way to mitigating and limiting the risk of the net limit being exceeded. For illustrative 
purposes, suppose the bank marked a gross limit on the overdraft of R100 and a net limit of R60. 
In the morning the customer holds credit balances of R70 and is overdrawn in the amount of 
R100. It is therefore well within its net limit. Should the customer for whatever reason pay away 
all of its credit balances, the bank’s gross exposure will never exceed R100 (being the gross 
overdraft limit which its systems can automatically enforce).  
Finally, loans and deposits with a bank must be treated as cash collateral.
124
 This has two 
consequences: it recognises that on balance sheet netting is a form of credit risk mitigation and 
that the loans and deposits are encumbered by the netting agreement and may therefore not be 
used as collateral for any other purpose. 
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5. SET-OFF IN ENGLISH LAW 
5.1. The banker’s right of set-off at English common law 
Also referred to as the banker’s right to combine accounts or consolidate accounts, the right is 
analogous to but must not be confused with the banker’s right of lien.
125
 This right of set-off 
allows a bank to combine separate accounts of its customer and arrive at a net balance. The terms 
right of set-off, right to combine accounts and right to consolidate accounts will be used 
interchangeably. 
A useful distinction that can be drawn is between a current (or trading) account and loan 
account. A current account is used for daily transactional purposes and must be kept in credit 
whereas a loan account is used to record monies advanced by the bank to the customer.
126
 It is 
well established that the bank has the right to combine two current accounts unless there exists a 
contrary agreement between the bank and the customer. 
127
 However, where the bank permits a 
customer to maintain both a current account and a loan account, it has been held that it is an 
implied term of such an arrangement that the bank will not combine the two accounts.
128
 In order 
to combine such accounts the bank would have to clearly retain that right in its agreement with 
the customer. The implied term which prevents a banker from combining a current account and a 




This is illustrated by the case of Halesowen (supra). The customer held an account with the 
bank which was overdrawn in the amount of £11,339 (‘no. 1 account’). The bank was extremely 
concerned about this debit balance and meetings were held and correspondence was exchanged 
between the parties in an attempt to remedy this outstanding amount. According to the 
customer’s accountant, if the customer’s business was to be sold as a going concern the bank 
would be repaid the full amount; however if the customer’s assets were to be realised at a forced 
sale only a portion of the bank’s claim would be settled. The customer had opened a new 
transactional account with another bank as it feared that any cash which flowed into the no. 1 
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account would be utilised for the permanent reduction of the outstanding balance leaving the 
customer with insufficient funds to continue its business operations. It was therefore agreed 
between the parties that the no. 1 account would be frozen and that the customer would move its 
transactional account which was in credit to the bank (‘no. 2 account’). This account would 
always be kept in credit and the bank would only be entitled to use the funds standing to the 
customer’s credit in the no. 2 account for paying any charges and interest (on the no. 1 account). 
Thus, the no. 1 account was a loan account and the no. 2 account a current/trading account. This 
arrangement would remain in place until the customer sold the business or liquidated its assets 
within four months or if there arose ‘materially changed circumstances’.
130
 
Approximately one month after this arrangement was put in place, the customer notified 
the bank that a meeting of creditors would shortly be held to consider the winding up of the 
company. It was common cause that this notification constituted materially changed 
circumstances which would have entitled the bank to terminate the arrangement. Despite this 
notification, the bank permitted the customer to continue to trade using the no. 2 account. On the 
morning of the creditors’ meeting (which took place later that afternoon), a cheque drawn in 
favour of the customer in the amount of £8,611 was deposited at the bank and credited to the no. 
2 account. At the creditors’ meeting it was resolved that the customer should be placed in 
liquidation. The bank then sought to rely on the banker’s right of set-off and to set off the 
amount owing on the no. 1 account against the balance on the no. 2 account (which was in credit 
due largely to the cheque that had been deposited that morning).
131
 The bank contended that it 
was owed the resulting balance by its customer (in liquidation). The liquidator saw things 
differently and contended that the bank was not permitted to set-off or combine the two accounts. 
It accordingly instituted legal proceedings against the bank to recover the amount of the cheque 
(which had been credited to the no. 2 account).
132
   
The liquidator was unsuccessful in the court a quo which held that the bank had not agreed 
to refrain under any circumstances from setting-off any balance on the no. 2 account against the 
amount owing under the no. 1 account.
133
 On appeal to the court of appeals, it was held by Lord 
Denning MR that there was such an agreement but that the giving of notice to the bank of the 
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meeting of creditors to be held constituted a material change in circumstances. This entitled the 
bank to terminate (or ‘determine’) the arrangement on the giving of reasonable notice to the 
customer (per Lord Denning MR). Winn LJ agreed that the bank had not terminated the 
arrangement but refrained from expressing a view as to the period of notice. The judges of 
appeal were unanimously of the view that since bank had not given any notice before combining 
the two accounts, it was not entitled to do so. The majority of the court accordingly allowed the 
appeal. Buckley LJ held that immediate notice may have sufficed provided the bank honoured 
cheques drawn up to the time of receipt of notice. His lordship otherwise dissented and dismissed 
the appeal on different grounds that were unrelated to the omission to give notice, namely that 
the two accounts constituted ‘mutual’ debits and credits as contemplated by s 31 of the 
Bankruptcy Act, 1914 (as applied by the s 317 of the Companies Act, 1948) and the set-off of 
mutual debits and credits was mandatory under that Act. Any agreement to the contrary was 
overridden by this statutory set-off. This issue will be more fully explored when the impact of 
legislation on the right of set-off is dealt with below.  
In a further appeal to the House of Lords, the law lords generally refrained from expressing 
a view on the period of notice required. The exceptions were Lord Simon of Glaisdale who 
stated obiter that immediate notice may suffice provided the bank honoured cheques drawn up to 
the time of receipt of notice
134
 and Lord Kilbrandon who questioned the very relevance of notice 
once insolvency had intervened.
135
  
The House of Lords found for the bank on two grounds. First, the substratum of the 
agreement between the bank and the customer was to keep the customer trading as a going 
concern or to provide it with time to dispose of its assets profitably. It was never in the 
contemplation of the parties that the agreement would continue on the customer’s insolvency 
because once insolvency had intervened neither of the two objectives could be realised. The 
agreement therefore terminated on the passing of the creditors’ resolution to liquidate the 
customer and it was then open to the bank to combine the two accounts.
136
 Second, even if this 
was not the case, s 31 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1914 was applicable. As mentioned above, this will 
be more fully explored below when statutory set-off is discussed. 
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The right is subject to certain limitations and exceptions. The indebtedness in the accounts 
available for set-off must be due and payable. It is not permissible for a bank to set-off a debt 
that is due and payable in one account with a debt that is only payable in future in another 
account or a debt which is contingent in nature.
137
 
There are three main exceptions to this right.
138
 First, the right can be excluded by 
agreement, either implied or express, between the bank and the customer. As example of this is 
the Halesowen case (supra) which has just been discussed. Where two current accounts are 
denominated in different currencies the accounts should also be subject to the banker’s right of 
set-off as holding different currencies in different accounts does not necessary imply that the 
banker’s right of combination was to be excluded.
139
 Where the bank accounts are held in 
different jurisdiction the position is more complicated. It must be ascertained whether the foreign 
jurisdiction laws of set-off apply and if so, whether they permit the banker’s right of set-off.
140
  It 
could be argued that it is implied that the right to set-off does not apply because foreign offices 
are often viewed as separate from the local bank. On the other hand, where a monies are 
deposited with a foreign office which fails to repay the customer, the customer can demand 
payment from the main local office. This may allow the main local bank to argue that the implied 
term is no longer applicable because the agreement not to combine has been terminated.
141
  
Second, where an item of property (such as cash) was deposited with the bank and 
‘appropriated for a given purpose’.
142
 This occurred in W.P Greenhalgh & Sons v Union Bank of 
Manchester.
143
 The claimants had sold cotton to W & Sons who onsold the cotton to spinners. 
The purchase consideration was settled by the spinners who issued a bill of exchange in favour 
of W & Sons. The bill was remitted by W & Sons to the defendant bank which credited the 
proceeds of the bill to the W & Sons’ account thereby reducing the overdraft. The plaintiffs 
contended that the bill of exchange was remitted to the bank for a specific purpose (namely 
securing the purchase price which was owed by W & Sons to the claimants) and that the bank 
had actual knowledge of this purpose. It was held that: 
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‘If a person making a payment of money...to another, states definitely that such payment is to 
be used for a particular purpose, and the person to whom it is made does not dissent, he 
accepts it for the purpose and must use it...only for the purpose for which he receives it...’
144
 
Although this case dealt with the rights of third parties, it is also authority for the principle 
that where a single customer holds more than one account with a bank and monies are deposited 
with the bank which are to be appropriated for a specific purpose and the bank has actual 
knowledge of this specific purpose, then the bank may not combine accounts to the extent of the 
amount of funds earmarked for the specific purpose.
145
 This principle was subsequently 
confirmed in by the House of Lords in Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd.
146
 
Third, a bank cannot combine a customer’s private account with a trust account held by it 
or with an account held by it in its capacity as trustee. The bank however must have actual 
knowledge that the monies in the account are being held in trust or for a trust.
147
  
5.2. Statutory set-off on insolvency 
The provisions governing the right of set-off on insolvency are to be found in different pieces of 
legislation. Set-off on bankruptcy is dealt with in s 323 of the Insolvency Act
148
 and set-off on 
administration and liquidation is dealt with in Rules 2.85 and 4.90 of the Insolvency Rules
149
 
respectively. Despite this, the wording of the provisions governing set-off on administration and 
liquidation is virtually identical and the main principles applicable in liquidation apply equally to 
set-off on administration and bankruptcy.
150
 
Accordingly, only Rule 4.90 governing set-off on liquidation will be analysed. For 
comparative purposes s 323 of the Insolvency Act
151
 is contained in Appendix IV hereto. 
Rule 4.90 reads as follows: 
‘4.90.—Mutual credits and set-off 
(1) This Rule applies where, before the company goes into liquidation there have been 
mutual credits, mutual debts or other mutual dealings between the company and any 
creditor of the company proving or claiming to prove for a debt in the liquidation. 
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(2) The reference in paragraph (1) to mutual credits, mutual debts or other mutual dealings 
does not include– 
(a) any debt arising out of an obligation incurred at a time when the creditor had notice that– 
(i) a meeting of creditors had been summoned under section 98; or 
(ii) a petition for the winding up of the company was pending; 
(b) any debt arising out of an obligation where– 
(i) the liquidation was immediately preceded by an administration; and 
(ii) at the time the obligation was incurred the creditor had notice that an application for an 
administration order was pending or a person had given notice of intention to appoint 
an administrator; 
(c) any debt arising out of an obligation incurred during an administration which 
immediately preceded the liquidation; or 
(d) any debt which has been acquired by a creditor by assignment or otherwise, pursuant to 
an agreement between the creditor and any other party where that agreement was 
entered into– 
(i) after the company went into liquidation; 
(ii) at a time when the creditor had notice that a meeting of creditors had been summoned 
under section 98; 
(iii) at a time when the creditor had notice that a winding up petition was pending; 
(iv) where the liquidation was immediately preceded by an administration, at a time when 
the creditor had notice that an application for an administration order was pending or a 
person had given notice of intention to appoint an administrator; or 
(v) during an administration which immediately preceded the liquidation. 
(3) An account shall be taken of what is due from each party to the other in respect of the 
mutual dealings, and the sums due from one party shall be set off against the sums due 
from the other. 
(4) A sum shall be regarded as being due to or from the company for the purposes of 
paragraph (3) whether– 
(a) it is payable at present or in the future; 
(b) the obligation by virtue of which it is payable is certain or contingent; or 
(c) its amount is fixed or liquidated, or is capable of being ascertained by fixed rules or as a 












(5) Rule 4.86 shall also apply for the purposes of this Rule to any obligation to or from the 
company which, by reason of its being subject to any contingency or for any other 
reason, does not bear a certain value. 
(6) Rules 4.91 to 4.93 shall apply for the purposes of this Rule in relation to any sums due to 
the company which– 
(a) are payable in a currency other than sterling; 
(b) are of a periodical nature; or 
(c) bear interest. 
(7) Rule 11.13 shall apply for the purposes of this Rule to any sum due to or from the 
company which is payable in the future. 
(8) Only the balance (if any) of the account owed to the creditor is provable in the 
liquidation. Alternatively the balance (if any) owed to the company shall be paid to the 
liquidator as part of the assets except where all or part of the balance results from a 
contingent or prospective debt owed by the creditor and in such a case the balance (or 
that part of it which results from the contingent or prospective debt) shall be paid if 
and when that debt becomes due and payable. 
(9) In this Rule ‘obligation’ means an obligation however arising, whether by virtue of an 
agreement, rule of law or otherwise.’ 
The application of Rule 4.90 on insolvency is mandatory and creditors may not contract 
out of its provisions.
152
 Although Halesowen HL (supra) dealt with s 31 of the Bankruptcy Act, 
1914 the section is almost identical to Rule 4.90(3).
153
 It was made applicable to companies by s 
317 of the Companies Act, 1948.
154
 More recently, it was held in Stein v Blake
155
 that the set-off 
is ‘automatic and self-executing’ and that it operates without any steps having to be taken by 
either of the parties.
156
 
While Rule 4.90 is largely self-explanatory, certain aspects of the Rule require further 
analysis. Rule 4.90(1) applies where ‘there have been mutual credits, mutual debts or other 
mutual dealings between the company and any creditor of the company’. The operative provision 
states that an ‘account shall be taken of what is due from each party to the other in respect of the 
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mutual dealings…’ between the insolvent company and its creditor or debtor and ‘the sums due 
from one party shall be set off against the sums due from the other.’
157
 Mutual dealings must be 
between the same persons ‘in the same right’.
158
  
The requirement that the debt must be owed by the solvent to the insolvent may seem 
obvious and is unproblematic where the customer (as borrower) has gone into insolvency. Even 
if the bank does not have a guarantee from the third party depositor, it can exercise its rights 
under the charge. The situation may however become complex when a third party has provided 
security in the form of a cash deposit with the bank and the bank (as lender) has gone into 
liquidation. This is a rare occurrence but it can and does happen.
159
 
The third party is often the holding company of the customer (borrower) and the cash 
collateral is used as security for obligations of the customer. In addition to the cash collateral, the 
third party may also guarantee performance of the customer or assume the liabilities of a 
principal debtor. There are two possible approaches in this scenario.
160
 In the first approach, 
which will be referred to as the liquidator’s approach, the liquidator of the lender will wish to 
prove a claim against the borrower for the full amount of the loan and retain the deposit of the 
third party, which will have a concurrent claim against the insolvent lender. In the second 
approach, which will be referred to as the depositor’s approach, the third party (as depositor) will 
want the liquidator of the lender to set-off the deposit against the loan owed by the borrower to 
the insolvent lender. 
The difference between the two approaches is not merely of theoretical interest and can 
yield significantly different results in practice. For illustrative purposes, consider the example 
where the loan and the deposit are both in the amount of R1 million and the concurrent claim of 
third party depositor will yield a dividend of 10 cents in the Rand (i.e. R100,000). On the 
liquidator’s approach the liquidator will retain the R1 million deposit and claim the full R1 
million from the borrower. The aggregate cost to the borrower and the third party will be R1.9 
million (ie. the R1 million owed by the borrower to the insolvent lender and the R900,000 which 
the third party depositor is unable to recover from the insolvent lender). On the depositor’s 
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approach however, the loan and the deposit will be set-off against one another. In the result, the 
aggregate cost to the borrower and third party depositor will be nil.
161
  
It was precisely this clash of approaches which occurred in the case of MS Fashions.
162
 In 
the security documentation, the depositor had assumed the liabilities of a principal debtor. The 
Court of Appeal held that the amount of the loan owing by the borrower had to be set off in 
terms of Rule 4.90 against the amount of the deposit. There was no need for the liquidator to 
make demand because the liabilities of the principal debtor were enforceable without the need 
for such a demand.
163
 
The facts of the BCCI case were almost identical to those in MS Fashions (supra). The 
security documentation however did not create a liability of principal debtor for the depositor. In 
summarising the ‘Letter of Lien/Charge’ Lord Hoffmann stated that ‘the document does not 
contain any promise by Mr Jessa to pay what may be due from Rayners to the bank’.
164
 The 
depositor (Mr Jessa) did not promise as guarantor nor assume liability of principal debtor the 
obligations of the borrower (Rayner Enterprises Inc). It was on this point that the House of Lords 
distinguished Ms Fashions (supra) from BCCI (supra):  
‘The case [MS Fashions (supra)] involved a very unusual security document in which, 
although no personal obligation was expressly created, references were made to the liability of 
the depositor being that of the principal debtor. It was only to give effect to these words that the 
document was construed as creating a personal liability limited to the amount of the deposit. This 
was held to result in a set-off between depositor and BCCI which, since depositor and principal 




The House of Lords noted that it was anomalous that a depositor who gave a personal 
guarantee could be worse off than a depositor who assumed joint and several liability with the 
borrower. In the case of a personal guarantee, a demand for payment from the guarantor prior to 
the grant of the order of liquidation was required in order for the debt to be ‘due’ by the 
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guarantor and for there to be mutuality of dealings between the bank and the guarantor at the 
time when the order of liquidation was granted. The distinction was artificial because the bank 
would not wish to rely on the depositor’s personal liability; the bank ‘will simply keep the 
money in accordance with the letter of charge.’
166
 The difficulty with resolving this anomaly was 
arriving at a different answer which recognises ‘the automatic and self-executing nature of set-
off under Rule 4.90 and the principle that joint and several debtors are liable for the same debt so 
that payment or deemed payment by the one discharges the other’.
167
 In the case of a charged 
(i.e. encumbered) deposit it may be that the existence of the charge destroys mutuality: the 
bank’s claim against the depositor is in its own right but the depositor’s claim against the bank is 
subject to the bank’s equitable interest. This possibility was rejected in MS Fashions (supra).
168
 
In the Court of Appeal in BCCI (supra), another possibility was suggested: the collection 
and distribution of assets takes place retrospectively; it follows that the debt would be 
immediately recovered from the depositor (as principal debtor) prior to Rule 4.90 being applied 
on insolvency and once the debt was discharged there would be nothing left to set-off.
169
 Lord 
Hoffmann expressly refrained from commenting on the debate and left it open for decision in the 




The requirement of mutuality of credits, debts and other dealings was also considered in 
Halesowen HL (supra). It was held that the Court of Appeal had taken an unduly narrow view of 
mutuality and that both the no. 1 account and the no. 2 account formed part of the relationship 
between banker and customer.
171
 Viscount Dilhorne cited with approval the following statement 
of Buckley LJ in his dissenting judgement in the Court of Appeal:
172
  
‘Each of the obligations on either side on the two banking accounts arose from the 
relationship between the parties as banker and customer….The agreement was intended to 
have temporary effect only, at the end of which the parties contemplated that both accounts 
would become part of their general banking relationship as banker and customer.’
173
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The House of Lords observed that every contractual provision has special or specific 
purpose in the ordinary sense of those words but that something additional was required to 
exclude a transaction from the concept of ‘mutual dealings’. Monies paid or deposited for a 
special or specific purpose would be excluded from that concept if it would be a 
‘misappropriation’ to use it for any other purpose.
174
  
Rule 4.90(1) applies to mutual credits, mutual debits and mutual dealings which arose or 
took place ‘before the company goes into liquidation’. Section 247(2) of the Insolvency Act 
1986 provides that a company goes into liquidation when it passes a resolution for its winding up 
or when the order of winding up is made by the court. This must be distinguished from the 
commencement of liquidation which is either the time of the passing of a resolution in a 
voluntary winding up or when the petition for winding up is before the court (or the time of 
passing any pre-petition resolution for the winding up of the c mpany). This creates the 
possibility of a conflict between Rule 4.90 and the provisions of s 127(1) of the Insolvency Act 
1986 which renders any disposition of a company’s property void if it is made after the 
commencement of winding up (unless the court orders otherwise). On the one hand, to the extent 
that s 127 might conflict with Rule 4.90, the provisions of the section may well prevail.
175
 This is 
most disturbing because in the case of a court ordered winding up the liquidation will always 
commence prior to the company going into liquidation. Its effect will be to render Rule 4.90 
inapplicable with a resulting inconsistency between set-off on liquidation and set-off on 
bankruptcy.
176
 It is submitted that this could never have been the intention of the drafters of 
either the Act or the Rules and offends against set-off on insolvency being an exception from the 
pari passu principle.
177
 It can be argued that the making of a disposal implies an act or omission 
by either the insolvent or its creditor. Where a disposal occurs or takes place due to self-
executing, subordinate legislation, it has not been made by either of the parties but has rather 
taken place automatically by operation of law (as the Rules are subordinate legislation).  
As appears from Rule 14(4), the mutual credits and debts which are set-off can be payable 
at present or in the future, certain or contingent in nature, or its amount is fixed, liquidated, 
capable of being ascertained by fixed rules or as a matter of opinion.  
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The reference to ‘matter of opinion’ is consistent with Rule 14.90(5) which applies Rule 
4.86 to any obligation uncertain in value due to a contingency or for any other reason. Rule 4.86 
also permits the liquidator to revise an estimate should circumstances change or information 
become available to them.  
A contingent liability can be quantified right up to the time until account is taken of it and 
it will be backdated to the date of liquidation. As Lord Hoffmann in Stein (supra) stated:
178
 
‘The first is to take into account everything which has actually happened between the 
bankruptcy date and the moment when it becomes necessary to ascertain what, on that date, 
was the state of account between the creditor and the bankrupt. If by that time the 
contingency has occurred and the claim has been quantified, then that is the amount which is 
treated as having been due at the bankruptcy date.’ 
The court drew an important distinction between the date of bankruptcy (or liquidation) 
and the date when the liability is quantified which may well be some time after the date of 
bankruptcy (or liquidation)
179
. Even if the contingency does not become an actual direct liability, 
a change in circumstances may still require that the original estimate be revised. The second 
method which the court then proceeds to described is that contained in s 322(3) of the Insolvency 
Act 1986 which is very similar to Rule 4.86. This requires that the trustee estimate the contingent 
liability or any liability which does not bear a certain value and this estimate is then backdated to 




Rule 4.86 only applies where the insolvent person or entity has a claim against a solvent 
debtor. The court in Stein (supra) commented that there is no such technique for quantifying 
contingent or unascertained claims against the creditor of the insolvent because ‘it would be 
unfair upon him to his liability to pay advanced merely because the trustee wants to wind up the 
bankrupt’s estate’. 
Rule 40.90 (6) applies the provisions of Rule 4.91 (where a debt is incurred or payable in a 
foreign currency), Rule 4.92 (where a creditor has a claim for debts of a periodical nature) and 
Rule 4.93 (interest which may be levied after the company went into liquidation). Rule 11.13 
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provides for debts payable in future which are quantified by discounting by five percent per 
annum. 
5.3. Set-off and assignment 
The effect of assignment by a customer of its rights to a deposit held with a bank was 
summarised in Business Computers Ltd v Anglo-African Leasing Ltd which summarised the 
position as follows: 
‘The result of the relevant authorities is that a debt which accrues due before notice of an 
assignment is received, whether or not it is payable before that date, or a debt which arises out of 
the same contract as that which gives rise to the assigned debt, or is closely connected with that 
contract, may be set off against the assignee. But a debt which is neither accrued nor connected 
may not be set off even though it arises from a contract made before the assignment.’
181
 
Of significance to banks is the requirement that the debt must be due (even if it is payable 
in future) thereby excluding contingent debts from its scope of operation. For example, suppose a 
bank has issued a letter of credit on the instructions of its customer and has taken its customer’s 
deposit as security. The customer assigns its rights to repayment of the deposit to a third party 
and the bank only pays out under the letter of credit after it has received notice of the 
assignment. Thus, the bank’s claim against the customer only undergoes the transformation from 
contingent to due after it has received the notice of assignment thereby depriving the bank of the 
right to set-off the the amount paid out under the letter of credit against the assignee’s rights to 
the deposit.
182
 As in the case of South African law, it would be prudent for the bank to ensure the 
presence of adequate restrictions on assignment by the customer of any claims it may have 
against the bank.  
Regarding the degree of closeness required of the connectedness between the two debts 
and the contract, the facts of Business Computers (supra) provide some guidance. In casu, the 
plaintiff sold two computers pursuant to two higher purchase agreements (‘the first two HP 
agreements’) to the defendant which in turn on sold them on higher purchase to other parties. 
The total amount owed by the defendant for these transactions was in the sum of £10,587.50. 
Plaintiff also sold a computer to the defendant for its own use and leased back the computer from 
the defendant (‘the third HP agreement’). The plaintiff was thus the lessee under that agreement 
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and was obliged to pay rental to the defendant. Financing for the plaintiff’s operating expenses 
had been obtained by the plaintiff in the form of bank loans and it had issued debentures as 
security for these loans.  
The plaintiff became insolvent and defaulted on its obligations under the third HP 
agreement with the defendant by failing to pay rent in the amount of £1,477.20. In terms of the 
third HP agreement should the plaintiff fail to pay any instalment in respect of rent for a period 
exceeding more than fourteen days after it had fallen due and payable, the defendant could 
determine (ie terminate the contract) and recover all arrears as well as damages calculated in 
accordance with the  contract. On 13 June the debenture holders appointed a receiver. The effect 
of this was to transform the incomplete assignment of the first two HP agreements to the 
debenture holders to a complete assignment:
183
   
‘A floating charge is ambulatory and hovers over the property until some event occurs which 
causes it to settle and crystallise into a specific charge...One of the events which causes 
crystallisation is the appointment of a receiver...One of the consequences of the receiver’s 
appointment by the debenture holders was that the incomplete assignment constituted by the 




The receiver gave the defendant notice of the assignment on 17 June. It was therefore 
common cause that the amount of £10,587.50 could be set-off against the amount owing by the 
plaintiff to the defendant in the amount of £1,477.20 leaving a balance owing of £9,110.30. It 
should be emphasized that as at this date, the defendant had still not determined the third HP 
agreement and the amount of £1,477.20 was therefore the only amount due to the defendant 
under this agreement. On 31 July the receiver repudiated the third HP agreement and this 
repudiation was accepted on 8 August by the defendant. It was only at this date that the 
defendant obtained the right to claim £30,000 in damages from the plaintiff in accordance with 
the third HP agreement.
185
   
The defendant sought to set-off this amount of £30,000 against the amount of £9,110.30  it 
owed the plaintiff, which (by the receiver) objected on the grounds that amounts owing were in 
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respect of different contracts and any set-off would be subject to the debenture holders complete 
assignment (thereby rendering them complete assignees) which took place on 17 June. 
The court held that the first two HP agreements and the third HP agreement were 
insufficiently closely related to one another and that the defendant could not set two amounts off. 
It further held that since the assignment became complete on 17 June, the amount of £30,000 
could not be set-off against the assignees because it only became due on a later date when the 


















6. CASH MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA: MULTIPLE LEGAL ENTITIES  
6.1. Introduction and regulation 13 
Cash management for multiple legal entities is governed by regulation 16 read together with the 
definition of ‘cash management scheme’ contained in regulation 65 of the Regulations.
187
 The 
definition contemplates an actual scheme whereby cash balances are transferred between 
participating companies within the same group (whose financial statements are required to be 
consolidated). Whereas cash management for single legal entities may be availed of by any type 
of legal entity, this is not the case with multiple legal entities.  
Before dealing with regulation 16, it must be asked whether regulation 13 may be used by 
companies as an alternative to regulation 16 and whether entities other than companies can rely 
on regulation 13 for legal set-off ( in relation to multiple legal entities). In terms of s 6(b) of the 
Interpretation Act
188
 in every law, which includes subordinate legislation, unless the contrary 
intention appears words in the singular number include the plural, and words in the plural 
number include the singular. It follows that the only impediment to using regulation 13 for 
multiple companies or for multiple entities other than companies is if a contrary intention 
appears from the Regulations.  
Regulation 16 read together with the definition of ‘cash management schemes’ specifically 
deals with cash management of companies within a group. The implication (albeit not a 
necessary implication) of this specific provision is that it was intended to exclude the more 
general regulation 13, at least where a group of companies are concerned. On the other hand, the 
definition of ‘cash management scheme’ is very specific and includes interest optimisation by 
way of transferring balances. It remains silent on interest optimisation by way of other methods 
such as notional set-off in terms of regulation 13. It is submitted that in this regard the position is 
unclear. 
What then is the position of entities other than companies? May they rely on regulation 13? 
It can be argued that had it been intended to exclude multiple legal entities from relying on 
regulation 13, the drafter would not have introduced the concept of an ‘obligor’ in paragraphs 
2(b) and (3) and simply used the term ‘person’ in its place. Paragraph (3) would then have 
defined a ‘person’ as excluding the definition of ‘person’ in regulation 65. 
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Regulation 65 defines a ‘person’ as including: 
‘(a) two or more persons, whether natural or juristic, that, unless proved to the contrary, 
constitute a single risk due to the fact that one of them has direct or indirect control 
over the other or others; or 
(b) two or more persons, whether natural or juristic, between whom there is no 
relationship or control as referred to in (a) above, but that are to be regarded as 
constituting a single risk, due to the fact that they are so interconnected that should 
one of them experience financial difficulties, the other or all of them would be likely 
to encounter repayment difficulties;’. 
Thus, it appears that the exclusion, in regulation 13(3), of the definition of a ‘person’ in 
regulation 65 takes the matter no further.  
However, the very introduction of the term ‘obligor’ in paragraph (3) implies that the 
customer and the ‘obligor’ are not necessarily one and the same person. It therefore remains a 
possibility persons other than companies such as natural persons, close corporations and trusts 
could rely on regulation 13 for multiple legal entity set-off. However, due to the current 
difficulty with the enforceability of set-off on insolvency in South African law, it is not possible 
to comply with regulation 13 whether for a single legal entity or multiple legal entities. 
6.2. Regulation 16 
This regulation applies to cash management schemes as defined in regulation 65 and reads as 
follows: 
‘16. Cash-management schemes 
(1) Unless specifically otherwise specified or prescribed in these Regulations, the 
reduction of balances resulting from the application of a cash-management scheme 
shall be taken into account in completing the prescribed forms only when all of the 
conditions specified below are met. 
(a) The cash-management scheme shall be conducted only for companies that are 
subsidiaries of the same holding company and that are included in the group audited 
annual financial statements of such holding company, as well as for such holding 
company. 
(b) Any transfers of debit or credit balances from individual accounts to a central group 
account shall be shown as actual transactions on individual accounts, as well as in the 












accounting system of the relevant bank reflects the true debtor/creditor and legal 
relationships. 
(c) The bank shall provide its clients with statements of account evidencing the effect of 
transfers, whenever such transfers are made between their accounts and a central 
group account, in order to enable the clients of the bank to make the necessary entries 
to ensure that their respective accounting records reflect the true debtor/creditor and 
legal relationships vis-a-vis the bank (except for uncleared items, balances in the 
books of clients should therefore correspond to balances on client accounts in the 
accounting system of the relevant bank). 
(d) A group account, or any other account to which transfers are made, shall be in the 
name of a legal entity in order to protect the legal position of the bank. 
(e) Any transfer between client accounts and a central group account shall be supported 
by legal authorisation granted to the bank by its clients, including resolutions of 
clients’ boards of directors to effect such transfer. 
(f) Written agreements whereby authorisation is granted as contemplated in paragraph (e) 
shall legally limit the bank’s risk to the debtor/creditor relationship that exists after 
transfers have been effected. 
(g) Any statutory return shall reflect the true debtor/creditor and legal relationships of the 
bank vis-a-vis its clients. 
(h) The bank entering into written agreements relating to cash-management schemes with 
its clients shall ensure that the clients are fully aware that after the transfer of balances 
on their accounts, they have no claim against or obligation to the bank in respect of the 
amounts so transferred. 
(i) The bank shall ensure that all written agreements relating to cash-management 
schemes entered into by it with clients are legal and binding. 
(j) Any cash-management scheme involving the transfer of balances among different 
legal entities, as well as a standardised written agreement, providing for the conduct of 
such a scheme, entered into between a bank and its clients, shall be submitted to the 
Registrar for approval.’ 
It is readily apparent from paragraphs (a) to (d) that funds are actually (not just notionally) 
transferred from one legal entity to or from a central group account. In order to optimise interest 
paid or earned, the participating companies in the group will transfer all credit balances to this 
group account and finance any debit balances from the group account at close of business each 












nominated group account resulting in the efficiencies mentioned in Chapter 1. Accounting 
records are to be kept by the bank evidencing these transfers and the resultant balances on the 
various accounts of participating companies.  
Of particular interest is paragraph (j) which requires a standardised agreement to be 
forwarded to the Registrar of Banks for their approval. Paragraphs (e) to (j) when read together 
conveys the Regulations concern that the agreements entered into and the conduct of the scheme 
are legally effective, valid and binding. This is understandable given the large amounts of funds 
that are transferred daily into or from the central bank account. Any scheme which is lacking in 
its legal effectiveness and validity may well expose the bank to sizeable liability.  
This is in stark contrast to regulation 13 which merely sets out the basic requirements for 
single entity set-off without the rigorous legal requirements and oversight functions of the 
Registrar of Banks. It is unclear how or why there is this inconsistency between the two 
regulations especially since the company with whom the central group account is held will wish 













7. CASH MANAGEMENT IN ENGLAND: MULTIPLE LEGAL ENTITIES  
The Financial Services Authority’s Handbook provides that the Interpretation Act 1978
189
 
applies to the Handbook
190
 and that this has the effect that unless the contrary appears words in 
the Handbook in the singular include the plural and words in the plural include the singular.
191
 
It is therefore permissible to interpret BIPRU 5.3 as applying to loans and deposits between 
the bank and counterparties. This can legally be achieved by the bank obtaining cross-
suretyships from the multiple legal entities participating in the cash management scheme. As has 
been demonstrated earlier, not only is set-off on insolvency possible in England but it is 
mandatory and applies to contingent liabilities as well. Because multiple counterparties are 
involved the bank should, in addition to cross-suretyships, obtain the right to set-off at any time 
any balances owed by any of the counterparties to the bank against any of the balances owed by 
the bank to any of the counterparties and restrict the counterparty’s right of assignment of any 
deposits with the bank. This will allow the bank to comply with BIPRU 5.3 and capital need only 
held on the notional net balance of all the participating counterparties.  
Nothing precludes a bank from offering a multiple customers a cash management scheme 
involving actual pooling and transfer of funds (such as is the case with cash management for 
multiple legal entities in South Africa) but the existence of a simple notional pooling system is 
likely to be preferred by all parties concerned. It saves the bank and the participating customers 
the burden of having to keep track of and calculate interest on intercompany loans on a daily 
basis. It is also open to participating customers to limit their liability under the cross-suretyship 
to credit balances which they hold with the bank.  
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 Chapter 30. 
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 GEN 2.2.11 of the FSA Handbook available at http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/GEN/2/2#D38, 
accessed on 28 December 2012. 
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Set-off on insolvency in South African law is problematic. The weight of authority supports set-
off as operating automatically and ipso iure and not retrospectively after being invoked by one of 
the parties. Obtaining a contractual right to set-off on insolvency (or just prior to insolvency) 
does not occur within the ordinary course of business and in terms of s 46 of the Insolvency 
Act
192
 may be impeached and set aside. Consequently, it is submitted that regulation 13 cannot 
be given effect to and may not be used for single entity cash management purposes. There exists 
the possibility that if the South African Law Commission’s proposed Bill is adopted, a right of 
set-off enforceable on insolvency may be possible. This will represent a fundamental shift in the 
South African law of set-off and insolvency. If and when a new Insolvency Act is passed into 
law is uncertain as is the content of such a piece of legislation. Although it is also uncertain how 
broadly or narrowly the court’s will interpret new legislation dealing with set-off on insolvency, 
it is submitted that a broad interpretation is correct and will permit regulation 13 to be given 
effect to.  
In contrast, English law mandates set-off on insolvency. A notional set-off scheme is 
therefore possible in English law and complies with the FSA’s Handbooks requirement of an 
enforceable right of set-off on bankruptcy for on-balance sheet netting. The relevant Handbook 
provision can also be interpreted in the plural and may therefore be used for cash management of 
multiple legal entities.  
It is submitted that in South Africa the Regulations only provide for notional set-off for 
single legal entities and cash management schemes, in order to comply with regulation 16, must 
be actual pooling schemes where actual transfers of funds take place. This generates 
intercompany loans which attract in administrative burden in that they must be constantly 
updated and interest calculated on a daily basis. There may also be tax implications for multiple 
legal entities who in good faith are simply seeking to optimise their interest earnings or expense, 
and not avoid tax. Accordingly, a notional cash management scheme for multiple legal entities is 
preferable.  
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COMPARISON OF NET INTEREST CHARGED WHERE AGGREGATE DEBIT 
BALANCES EXCEED AGGREGATE CREDIT BALANCES 













    
1 R1000 
credit 
R50   
2 R4000 debit  (R400)  
3 R2000 debit  (R200)  
TOTAL  R50 (R600) (R550) 
     
REPORTING OF NET 
BALANCE 
    
1 R1000 
credit 
   
2 R4000 debit    
3 R2000 debit    

















COMPARISON OF NET INTEREST EARNED WHERE AGGREGATE CREDIT 
BALANCES EXCEED AGGREGATE DEBIT BALANCES 













    
1 R1000 debit   (R100)  
2 R4000 
credit 
R200   
3 R2000 
credit 
R100   
TOTAL  R300 (R100) R200 
     
REPORTING OF NET 
BALANCE 
    
1 R1000 debit    
2 R4000 
credit 
   
3 R2000 
credit 
   
NET BALANCE R5000 
credit 
















BIPRU 5.3  On balance sheet netting 
Eligibility 
BIPRU 5.3.1  
01/01/2007 
A firm may recognise as eligible the on-balance sheet netting of mutual claims between 
the firm and its counterparty. 
[Note: BCD Annex VIII Part 1 point 3] 
BIPRU 5.3.2  
01/01/2007 
Without prejudice to BIPRU 5.6.1 R, eligibility is limited to reciprocal cash balances 
between a firm and a counterparty. Only loans and deposits of the lending firm may be 
subject to a modification of risk weighted exposure amounts and, as relevant, expected 
loss amounts as a result of an on-balance sheet netting agreement. 
[Note: BCD Annex VIII Part 1 point 4] 
 
Minimum requirements 
BIPRU 5.3.3  
01/01/2007 
For on-balance sheet netting agreements - other than master netting agreements covering 
repurchase transactions, securities or commodities lending or borrowing transactions 
and/or other capital market-driven transactions - to be recognised for the purposes of 
BIPRU 5 the following conditions must be satisfied: 
(1) they must be legally effective and enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions, including 
in the event of the insolvency or bankruptcy of a counterparty; 
(2) the firm must be able to determine at any time those assets and liabilities that are 
subject to the on-balance sheet netting agreement; 
(3) the firm must monitor and control the risks associated with the termination of the 
credit protection; and 
(4) the firm must monitor and control the relevant exposures on a net basis. 














Calculating the effects of credit risk mitigation 
BIPRU 5.3.4  
01/01/2007 
Loans and deposits with a lending firm subject to on-balance sheet netting are to be 
treated as cash collateral. 
















323.- Mutual credit and set-off. 
 
   (1) This section applies where before the commencement of the bankruptcy 
   there have been mutual credits, mutual debts or other mutual dealings 
   between the bankrupt and any creditor of the bankrupt proving or claiming to 
   prove for a bankruptcy debt. 
 
   (2) An account shall be taken of what is due from each party to the other in 
   respect of the mutual dealings and the sums due from one party shall be set 
   off against the sums due from the other. 
 
   (3) Sums due from the bankrupt to another party shall not be included in the 
   account taken under subsection (2) if that other party had notice at the 
   time they became due that a bankruptcy petition relating to the bankrupt was 
   pending. 
 
   (4) Only the balance (if any) of the account taken under subsection (2) is 
   provable as a bankruptcy debt or, as the case may be, to be paid to the 















South African cases 
Administrator, Natal v. Magill, Grant and Nell (Pty) Ltd (In Liquidation) 1969 (1) SA 660 (A). 
Affirmative Portfolios cc v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2009 (1) SA 196(SCA).  
Agricultural and Industrial Mechanisation (Vereeniging) (Pty) Ltd v Lombard 1974 (3) SA 485 
(O). 
Bain v Barclays Bank 1937 SR 191.  
Clark v Van Rensburg 1964 (4) 153 (O). 
Dantex Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v National Explosives (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) 1990 (1) 
SA 736 (A). 
Estate Wege v Strauss 1932 AD 76.  
Hardy NO & Mostert v Harsant 1913 TPD 433. 
Hendriks v Swanepoel 1962 (4) SA 338 (A). 
Herrigel NO v Bon Roads Construction Co (Pty) Ltd and another 1980 (4) SA 669 (SWA).  
Joint Municipal Pension Fund (Transvaal) v Pretoria Municipal Pension Fund 1969 (2) SA 78 
(T). 
Malherbe’s Trustee v Dinner 1922 OPD 18. 
National Bank v Cohen’s Trustee 1911 AD 235. 
Nichol v Burger 1990 (1) SA 231 (C). 
Oudtshoorn Town Council v Smith 1911 CPD 558. 
Roman Catholic Church (Klerksdorp Diocese) v Southern Life Association Ltd 1992 (2) SA 807 
(A). 
Southern Cape Liquors (Pty) Ltd v Delipcus Beleggings BK 1998 (4) SA 494 (C). 
The Government v Thorne and another, NNO 1974 (2) SA 1 (A).  
The Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Echo Petroleum cc 2012 (5) SA 283 (SCA). 
Thorne and another, NNO v The Government 1973 (4) SA 42 (T).  
Walker v Syfret NO 1911 AD 141. 
Willis Faber Enthoven (Pty) Ltd v Receiver of Revenue 1992 (4) SA 202 (A). 
English cases 












Business Computers Ltd v Anglo-African Leasing Ltd [1977] 2 All ER 741. 
George Barker (Transport) Ltd v Eynon [1974] 1 All ER 900, CA. 
Halesowen Pressworks & Assemblies Ltd v Westminster Bank Ltd [1970] 1 All ER 33. 
Halesowen Presswork & Assemblies Ltd v Westminster Bank Ltd [1970] 3 All ER 473,CA. 
MS Fashions Ltd v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (in liq.) (No 2), High Street 
Services Ltd v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (in liq.), Impexbond Ltd v Bank of 
Credit and Commerce International SA (in liq.) [1993] 3 All ER 769, CA. 
National Westminster Bank Ltd v Halesowen Presswork and Assemblies Ltd [1972] 1 All ER 
641, HL. 
Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 8) [1997] 4 All ER 568, HL. 
Stein v Blake [1996] 1 AC 243, HL, available at http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/ 
UKHL/1995/11.html accessed on 20 December 2012. 
W.P Greenhalgh & Sons v Union Bank of Manchester [1924] 2 KB 153. 
Web sources 
FSA Handbook available at http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/index.jsp accessed on 11 December 
2012. 
Legislation 
Banks Act 94 of 1990. 
Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2008 c. 8. 
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
National Payment System Act 78 of 1998. 
Securities Services Act 36 of 2004. 
Regulations 
Regulations relating to banks promulgated in terms of s 90 of the Banks Act 94 of 1990 
published in GNR 3 GG 30629 of 1 January 2008. 
SALC Projects 
South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 86 (Project 63) Review of the Law of 















Van Niekerk, B V D ‘Some thoughts on the problem of set-off’ (1968) 85 SALJ 31  
‘The Banker’s Guide to the Basel II Framework’ published by the Banking Association of South 
Africa (compiled by P Styger and PG Vosloo) (2005) accessed at 
http://www.banking.org.za/getdoc/getdoc.aspx?docid=848 on 30 March 2012  
Textbooks 
Bertelsman, Eberhard; Herbert, Walter; Evans, Roger G; Harris, Adams; Kelly-Louw, Michelle; 
Loubser, Anneli; Roestoff, Melanie; Smith, Alastair; Stander, Leonie; Steyn, Lee & Nagel, CJ 
(editor) Mars The Law of Insolvency in South Africa 9 ed (2008) Juta, Cape Town. 
Blackman, M S ‘Companies’ in WA Joubert (founding ed) The Law of South Africa vol 4(3) 
First Reissue (2006) Butterworths, Durban. 
Christie, RH & Bradfield, GB The Law of Contract in South Africa 6 ed (2011) LexisNexis. 
De Wet, J C & Van Wyk, A H Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg and Handelsreg 5 ed (1992) 
Butterworths, Durban. 
Ellinger, E P; Lomnicka, Eva & Hare, C V M Ellinger’s Modern Banking Law 5 ed (2011) 
Oxford University Press. 
Fountoulakis, Christiana Set-off Defences in International Commercial Arbitration. A 
Comparative Analysis (2011) Hart, Oxford. 
Hapgood, Mark Piaget’s Law of Banking 12 ed (2002) LexisNexis, Butterworths. 
Harms, L T C ‘Obligations’ in WA Joubert (founding ed) The Law of South Africa vol 19 2 ed 
(2006) Butterworths, Durban. 
Joubert, D J General Principles of the Law of Contract (1987) Juta, Cape Town. 
Keay, Andrew R & Walton, Peter Insolvency Law Corporate and Personal 2 ed (2008) Jordans, 
Bristol.  
Smith, Catherine The Law of Insolvency (1982) Butterworths, Durban. 
Van der Merwe, S; Van Huysteen L F; Reinecke, M F B & Lubbe, G F Contract General 
Principles 3 ed (2007) Juta & Co, Kenwyn South Africa  
The Selective Voet being the Commentary on the Pandects by Johannes Voet (translated by 
Percival Gane) vol 3 (1956) Butterworths, Durban. 
Wessels, J W The Law of Contract in South Africa vol II 2 ed (1951) Butterworths, Durban. 
